Eligibility Screening and Means Testing in Consumer Bankruptcy

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Abstract

Federal bankruptcy law is uniform across the United States, but consumer bankruptcy outcomes are not. Chapter choice (7 vs. 13), which largely determines the degree of debt relief, varies dramatically across the country. We investigate eligibility screening – how courts assess eligibility for each chapter – as a source of this variation. We develop a structural model incorporating multiple eligibility tests and geographic heterogeneity in their implementation. Screening differences strongly shape chapter choice: heterogeneity shifts the predicted Chapter 7 rate for a representative debtor from below 50% to above 70%, and this accounts for 11–22% of geographic variation in chapter choice. The 2005 bankruptcy reform's means test, intended to standardize eligibility screening, instead amplified existing disparities. Due to heterogeneity in implementation, uniform federal law fails to deliver uniform access to debt relief.

Keywords: Consumer Bankruptcy, Chapter Choice, Eligibility Screening, Regional Disparities
JEL: K35, G28, G51, R59

1 Introduction

In the U.S. consumer bankruptcy system, the most important decision a debtor makes is whether to file under Chapter 7 or Chapter 13. In Chapter 7, debtors obtain a quick discharge of most unsecured debts while paying nothing to unsecured creditors in nearly all cases.[1] In contrast, Chapter 13 requires a multi-year repayment plan with less debt relief.[2] Chapter choice thus determines the central tradeoff in bankruptcy – the balance between debt relief and creditor repayment – and, as a result, has been a frequent target of policy reform.[3]

Despite its centrality to bankruptcy policy, important determinants of chapter choice remain unidentified. Bankruptcy is governed by federal law, yet the share of consumer filings under Chapter 7 varies enormously across the country – from less than 25% to more than 90% across the 94 judicial districts. These patterns have persisted for decades and have little correlation with prominent state laws (e.g., asset exemptions), credit market characteristics, or economic conditions (Sullivan *et al.*, 1994; Keys *et al.*, 2020). Legal scholarship attributes much of this variation to "local legal culture" – persistent differences in the interpretation of federal law – but systematic quantitative evidence on its role in chapter choice is lacking (Braucher, 1993; Sullivan *et al.*, 1994; Lawless and Littwin, 2017). A second puzzle highlighting the difficulty of influencing chapter choice concerns the 2005 Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act (BAPCPA). BAPCPA introduced a means test aimed at restricting high-income debtors from filing under Chapter 7 (Lawless *et al.*, 2008), yet empirical studies find little impact on high-income filing behavior or chapter choice nationally.[4] These puzzles around chapter choice are particularly consequential given longstanding calls for greater uniformity in bankruptcy and chapter choice (Braucher, 1993; Sullivan *et al.*, 1994; Westbrook, 1998; Lawless and Littwin, 2017; American Bankruptcy Institute, 2019), and they point

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[1] While Chapter 7 debtors must repay creditors with nonexempt assets, 94-96% of Chapter 7 cases have no nonexempt assets (Jiménez, 2009; Pattison, 2020).

[2] The recovery rate on unsecured debt in Chapter 13 is 13%, compared to 0.5% in Chapter 7. These statistics are for the years 2010-2014. The debt discharge rate in Chapter 13 is 43%, compared to 96% in Chapter 7. Combining US Trustee Final Reports payments to general unsecured creditors with Federal Judicial Center data on outstanding unsecured debts. See Morrison and Uettwiller (2017) for other estimates.

[3] The 1984 Bankruptcy Act and the 2005 Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act both enacted barriers to Chapter 7. Recent policy proposals, such as Senator Warren's proposed bankruptcy reform, seek to reverse these features of the 2005 Reform or even eliminate Chapter 13 as an option (Warren, n.d.).

[4] Gross *et al.* (2021) summarizes their results and the empirical literature as "Overall, we find no evidence to suggest the means test had a large effect on the income composition of bankruptcy filers. This is consistent with anecdotal reports from bankruptcy attorneys (Littwin, 2016) and other evaluations of the reform and the income of bankruptcy filers (Ashcraft *et al.*, 2007; Lawless *et al.*, 2008; Albanesi and Nosal, 2018; Fisher, 2019)."

to a specific gap: the particular mechanisms that shape chapter choice remain unclear.

In this paper, we investigate a critical but understudied determinant of chapter choice: eligibility screening. When a debtor files, the case is screened by bankruptcy trustees and judges to determine whether the debtor is eligible for the chosen chapter; ineligible cases are dismissed or converted. A qualitative legal literature on local legal culture emphasizes significant heterogeneity in how courts implement the federal bankruptcy law (Wells *et al.*, 1991; Braucher, 1993; Sullivan *et al.*, 1994). Building on this literature, we develop a two-stage model of chapter choice in which eligibility is determined by two legal tests that are implemented differently across court districts. We find that eligibility screening is a quantitatively important determinant of chapter choice: a 1pp increase in the probability of being eligible for Chapter 7 (or a 1pp decline in the probability of being eligible for Chapter 13) raises the probability of filing under Chapter 7 by 1.84pp (elasticity 4.98). These effects are paired with substantial geographic heterogeneity in screening practices. Cross-district differences in screening shift predicted Chapter 7 filing for a representative debtor from below 50% to above 70%, and this heterogeneity closely tracks the persistent cross-district variation in chapter choice that policymakers have long sought to reduce. We also show that BAPCPA's means test, intended to increase uniformity in screening through a mechanical test,[5] actually exacerbated these disparities by reinforcing pre-existing differences in screening. Because screening practices restrict access to the two chapters, debtors in identical financial circumstances face substantially different access to debt relief depending on where they file.

In the first stage of our model, bankruptcy filers choose between Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 using a discrete choice framework similar to existing chapter choice models (Domowitz and Sartain, 1999; Zhu, 2011; Lawless and Littwin, 2017). We also incorporate a second stage where, after filing, the case faces eligibility screening through two legal tests. The first is BAPCPA's means test, which screens higher-income filers. The second is the totality test, a discretionary standard predating BAPCPA that evaluates whether the debtor's overall circumstances indicate abuse or bad faith.[6] Debtors and attorneys, informed about local practices, account for dismissal probability when making chapter choice decisions.

We estimate the model using data on more than two million consumer bankruptcy filings from

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[5]Two major goals of BAPCPA were to create uniform standards and limit judicial discretion (Sylvester, 2009).

[6]Our screening model also flexibly captures heterogeneity in court screening practices for Chapter 13.

fiscal years 2011-2015. Both the totality test and the means test play economically and statistically significant roles in chapter choice, with substantial cross-district heterogeneity in implementation. Some districts have lenient eligibility screening that allows most debtors to file Chapter 7, while others strictly screen debtors and regularly deem them ineligible.

We use the model estimates to examine two aspects of bankruptcy. First, we document the cross-district differences in eligibility screening and show that these differences are strongly correlated with the longstanding geographic patterns in chapter choice. Across districts, a representative debtor who files under Chapter 7 would face a dismissal probability ranging from only 1.7% to 15%, depending on where the filing occurs. The range of Chapter 13 dismissal probabilities is similar. Thus, eligibility screening creates substantial differences in access to debt relief across districts. In a correlational analysis, a summary measure of districts' dismissal practices accounts for 22% of the total geographic variation in chapter choice when no other covariates are included. After controlling for numerous legal, economic, demographic, and ideological covariates, these dismissal practices still account for 11% of the variation, which exceeds the *combined* contribution of several other legal factors prominent in the literature (asset exemptions, attorney fees, and wage garnishment laws).

Second, we examine the impact of BAPCPA's flagship feature – the means test – which aimed to screen higher income debtors from filing under Chapter 7. Because BAPCPA was a uniform federal law change and enacted several provisions simultaneously, identification of the means test's impact is challenging. Our model identifies district-specific means test screening practices, and we use this to generate counterfactual predictions of the impact of the means test on chapter choice in each district. The model reveals substantial heterogeneity: the means test had little effect on screening and chapter choice in some districts while, in others, it sharply restricts access to Chapter 7 and reduces the Chapter 7 share by more than 20 percentage points. Moreover, despite the goal of increased uniformity, the means test amplifies geographic heterogeneity in screening and chapter choice because the means test and the pre-existing totality test act as complements: districts with stricter totality tests also implement the means test more strictly, reinforcing pre-existing disparities. We validate these predictions using district-level changes in chapter choice around BAPCPA: the model-implied effects closely match the observed shifts, and geographic dispersion in chapter choice rises after 2005, consistent with complementarity between the means test and pre-existing screening.

Our study makes three primary contributions. First, we demonstrate that eligibility screening is a central, yet previously unmeasured, determinant of chapter choice and bankruptcy access. Second, we show that geographic heterogeneity in screening practices explains 11-22% of the persistent cross-district variation in Chapter 7 filings, exceeding the share explained by other prominent legal factors combined (attorney fees, exemptions, and garnishment laws). In doing so, we provide systematic quantitative evidence of a phenomenon long emphasized in qualitative legal research: the role of "local legal culture" in shaping bankruptcy outcomes (Braucher, 1993; Sullivan *et al.*, 1994; Lawless and Littwin, 2017). Third, we identify district-specific impacts of BAPCPA's means test, finding substantial heterogeneity in the impact of this federal law change. These results underscore how uniform federal policy changes can interact with pre-existing local practices to alter their impact and geographic disparities.

This study adds to three literatures pertaining to bankruptcy in the United States. The first includes a broad set of papers examining the determinants of bankruptcy, chapter choice, and dismissals. Eraslan *et al.* (2017) develop a structural model incorporating dismissal risk, focusing on BAPCPA's plan length restrictions within Chapter 13 and estimating the model using data from Delaware. Our paper, in contrast, focuses on chapter choice using a national sample with detailed geographic heterogeneity. The chapter choice portion of our model follows similar discrete choice bankruptcy models that examine the impact of laws and financial characteristics (Domowitz and Sartain, 1999; Gross and Souleles, 2015; Zhu, 2011; Miller, 2019). Other papers identify the impact of specific factors on chapter choice or filing decisions, such as asset exemptions (Pattison and Hynes, 2020), liquidity constraints (Gross *et al.*, 2014; Foohey *et al.*, 2016), traffic debt (Foohey *et al.*, 2020; Morrison *et al.*, 2020), payday loans (Skiba and Tobacman, 2019), attorney incentives (Lefgren *et al.*, 2010; McIntyre *et al.*, 2015), and the filer's race (Dickerson, 2012; Braucher *et al.*, 2012a,b), often relying on policy variation or other quasi-experimental approaches. Lastly, some papers use variation in dismissal rates across trustees to examine racial bias (Argyle *et al.*, 2023) and variation in dismissal rates across judges to identify the impact of Chapter 13 (Dobbie and Song, 2015; Dobbie *et al.*, 2017). Our model builds on this literature by incorporating realistic features of dismissals and geographic heterogeneity into a structural model of chapter choice.

Second, we contribute to understanding geographic variation in bankruptcy. Prior work finds that location, not individual differences, drives substantial variation in bankruptcy (Keys *et al.*,

2020). Similarly, qualitative accounts emphasize local legal culture as a driver of chapter choice (Braucher, 1993; Sullivan *et al.*, 1994). We provide direct, quantitative evidence that district-level screening practices are a central component of this local legal culture. When examining the geographic variation, we provide a more detailed review of the existing literature and quantify the contribution of screening relative to other factors.

Third, we contribute to papers examining BAPCPA's means test. Several studies examine its impact using macroeconomic models (Athreya, 2006; Li and Sarte, 2006; Chatterjee *et al.*, 2007; Gordon, 2015; Mitman, 2016; Nakajima, 2017; Gordon, 2017), while others assess treatment effects on filings (Cornwell and Xu, 2014; Gross *et al.*, 2021; Albanesi and Nosal, 2022), health insurance (Mahoney, 2015), and mortgage default (Li *et al.*, 2011). Our results highlight how geographic differences in pre-existing screens caused the means test's impact to vary widely, and we validate predictions against observed changes around BAPCPA.

2 Institutional Background

In the U.S., consumers choose to file for bankruptcy under either Chapter 7 or Chapter 13.[7] The chapter choice decision is made by the debtor and the debtor's attorney, and the relative benefits of the two chapters depend on the debtors' goals and financial characteristics. After the debtor chooses a chapter, a bankruptcy trustee and judge review the debtor's case to determine whether the debtor is eligible for the chosen chapter. Ineligible cases are dismissed or converted to the other chapter, which is costly for the debtor and the debtor's attorney. This section provides an overview of the institutional features that govern the chapter choice incentives and eligibility screening of debtors.

2.1 Debtor's Chapter Choice Incentives

The benefits and costs of choosing Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 depend on the debtors' goals and characteristics. In Chapter 7, debtors obtain a quick discharge of most unsecured debts. In exchange, they must repay creditors using any nonexempt assets. In Chapter 13, debtors enter a three- to five-year plan during which they repay creditors out of their disposable income but

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[7]Debtors can also file under Chapter 11 or Chapter 12, but these account for less than 0.5% of consumer bankruptcy filings.

can retain all of their assets. Chapter 13 debtors only obtain a discharge upon completion of the repayment plan. Roughly half of plans fail before completion, mostly due to the debtor missing payments, leaving the debtor without a discharge. Thus, Chapter 7 typically results in significant debt relief and little creditor repayment, while Chapter 13 results in less debt relief and more creditor repayment.

Most debtors would benefit more from Chapter 7, but Chapter 13 can be better in some situations. Nonexempt assets, secured debts and certain nondischargeable debts may cause a debtor to benefit more from Chapter 13. Debtors with significant nonexempt assets may choose Chapter 13 because it allows them to retain nonexempt assets, while Chapter 7 debtors must forfeit them. A combination of state and federal laws determines which assets are exempt. The largest exemptions are for home equity, and the amount protected varies across states from less than \$10,000 to more than \$500,000 (and is unlimited in seven states).[8] Homeowners and debtors with secured or nondischargeable debts (e.g., tax debt or government debt) may also find Chapter 13 more attractive because it provides more options for addressing foreclosure and delinquencies on secured or nondischargeable debts (Porter, 2011; Tabb, 2020; Morrison *et al.*, 2020). Chapter 13 often has lower upfront attorney fees, which may be important to liquidity-constrained debtors (Gross *et al.*, 2014; Foohey *et al.*, 2016). Debtors may also prefer Chapter 13 if they feel an obligation to repay some of their debt (Braucher, 1993; Porter, 2011), even though this does not translate into better credit scores (Jagtiani and Li, 2015).

2.2 Eligibility Screening

After the debtor decides which chapter to file, the bankruptcy trustee and bankruptcy judge review the case to determine if the debtor is eligible for the chosen chapter. The trustees, acting as the "watchdog over the bankruptcy process" (USTP, 2022), conduct much of the eligibility screening and, if they deem a case ineligible, they move to have the judge dismiss the case (Wells *et al.*, 1991). Judges nearly always agree with the trustee's determination; in more than 98.5% of enforcement actions that were decided by judicial review or consent, the trustee's action was granted (USTP, 2015). Cases facing dismissal under one chapter are often given the option to

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[8]Another important aspect of home protection is tenancy-by-the-entirety, which provides additional protection for married filers (Traczynski, 2019). The district-specific coefficients on the indicator for joint filings capture the role of these tenancy-by-the-entirety laws.

convert to the other chapter.

Because Chapter 7 generally provides more relief, most eligibility screening aims to restrict access to Chapter 7. There are two primary screens used to decide debtors' eligibility for Chapter 7: the means test and the totality test. For this paper, the key features of these tests are that they (i) apply simultaneously to determine debtors' eligibility, (ii) use different criteria, and (iii) have discretionary components that give rise to geographic heterogeneity in how they are applied.

BAPCPA's Means Test

In 2005, the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act implemented several major changes to the bankruptcy system, including its flagship feature, the *means test*. The means test is a formula-based, two-part test used to assess eligibility for Chapter 7. The test seeks to "ensure that debtors repay creditors the maximum they can afford" (House of Representatives, 2005) by restricting access to Chapter 7 for high-income debtors.[9] One major goal of the means test was to standardize eligibility screening through a formulaic approach (Carlson, 2007). In practice, however, the means test retains a significant discretionary component that is applied differently across courts.

The first part of the formulaic means test compares the debtor's recent income to the state's median income for households of the same size. Below-median-income debtors automatically pass the means test. Above-median-income debtors continue to the second part of the test. This second part compares the debtor's income to a set of allowable expense standards. If the debtor's monthly income exceeds the standards by a specified amount, the means test creates a "presumption of abuse" that may bar the debtor from filing under Chapter 7.

Although the means test is largely formulaic, there is room for discretion and variation across districts. In particular, failing the means test formula only creates a *presumption* of abuse. A debtor can still file under Chapter 7 if they rebut this presumption with special circumstances, such as a recent job loss, illness, or justifiable extra expenses. Trustees exercise broad discretion when evaluating these mitigating circumstances, frequently allowing the debtors to file under Chapter 7 (Perez, 2013; Bartell, 2018). Overall, trustees decline to seek dismissal in more than 60% of

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[9]There are many other provisions of BAPCPA enacted alongside the eligibility screening of the means test, such as the anti-cramdown provision affecting car loans, restrictions on plan length, and changes in how plan payments were calculated (Chakrabarti and Pattison, 2019; Eraslan *et al.*, 2017).

cases that fail the formulaic portion of the means test (USTP, 2022). However, bankruptcy courts disagree on what circumstances are sufficient to rebut the presumption of abuse. Some courts take a moderate approach, allowing debtors to rebut the presumption if they lack a "meaningful ability to repay," while others take a strict approach, allowing rebuttal for only the most exceptional situations (Perez, 2013). Alternatively, some courts view BAPCPA's mechanical means test as more debtor-friendly than the pre-existing screening methods (described below), and fall back to these pre-existing, discretionary screening methods to determine access to Chapter 7 (Carlson, 2007). These discretionary decisions of the trustees may lead to substantive differences in how the means test is administered across the 94 federal court districts.

Totality Test

In addition to BAPCPA's means test, debtors may be ineligible for Chapter 7 if their case is deemed bad faith or an abuse "under the totality of the circumstances." We refer to this as the *totality test*.[10] The first important fact is that the totality test predates BAPCPA and continues to apply in the post-BAPCPA period.[11] As additional evidence, annual reports of the U.S. Trustee Program (USTP) make it clear that "[e]ven if a case is not presumptively abusive under the means test, the Bankruptcy Code permits the USTP to seek dismissal based on the debtor's bad faith or the totality of the circumstances" (USTP, 2020).

There are three key features of the totality test. First, the test applies to *all* Chapter 7 debtors, including those with below-median income or who otherwise pass BAPCPA's means test (Landry III, 2008; Tabb, 2020). Second, although the Bankruptcy Code does not specify exactly what constitutes substantial abuse, courts have consistently used a debtor's ability to pay as the primary consideration in the totality test (Felsenfeld, 1998; Wedoff, 2005; Pottow, 2006).[12] Ability to pay is typically evaluated through the debtor's monthly disposable income (income less allowed expenses), which is captured in standard bankruptcy forms.

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[10]Chapter 7 cases can also be dismissed for "bad faith," but we focus on the totality of the circumstances because dismissals for bad faith alone are extremely rare (Landry III, 2008).

[11]In fact, BAPCPA strengthened the totality test by lowering the bar for dismissal from "substantial abuse" to only "abuse," and by eliminating a presumption in favor of granting relief to the debtor (Landry III, 2014). Post-BAPCPA court rulings, including the three appellate courts, find that the totality test still applies to debtors who pass the means test (Landry III, 2014).

[12]The Senate Report to the 1984 bill clarifies that "if a debtor can meet his debts without difficulty as they come due, use of Chapter 7 would represent a substantial abuse" (S.Rep. No. 65, to Senate Bill 445, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 43 (1984) as cited in In Re Fitzgerald, 155 B.R. 711 (W.D. Tex. 1993)).

Third, since the Bankruptcy Code does not define what constitutes an ability to pay, the totality test relies largely on court discretion. This has led to geographic heterogeneity in how the test is implemented. Some courts scrutinize all cases exceeding a certain dollar amount of monthly disposable income, such as $100, $166, or $200–$400 (Wells *et al.*, 1991; Wedoff, 2006). Others focus on the share of unsecured debt that could be repaid out of disposable income over a hypothetical Chapter 13 plan, with different courts finding abuse if the debtor could repay at least some percentage of his unsecured debt, varying from 20% to 100%.[13] Additionally, some courts consider factors beyond ability to pay, including whether the cause was a sudden event (job loss, illness), the reasonableness of the debtor's budget, and the debtor's recent spending behavior.[14] Courts place different weights on these other factors, with some viewing ability to pay alone as sufficient to constitute abuse, while others require it to be accompanied by other indications of abuse or bad conduct (Felsenfeld, 1998; Wedoff, 2005). As a result of these differences, the totality test screens Chapter 7 eligibility using ability to pay, but it is not formulaic and there is significant variation across courts in how the test is applied.

The totality test and other good faith requirements are also present in Chapter 13, although the implementation differs. In particular, the test under Chapter 13 requires that the debtor's repayment plan must be feasible, i.e., the debtor must have sufficient disposable income to fund a Chapter 13 plan and have a reasonable chance of completing the plan. These tests are enforced by Chapter 13 trustees and judges, often through discretionary minimum payment requirements for Chapter 13 plans (Braucher, 1993; Morrison and Uettwiller, 2017; Morrison *et al.*, 2020). While most eligibility screening is focused on limiting access to Chapter 7, the discretionary requirements for Chapter 13 feasibility further contribute to geographic heterogeneity in chapter choice.

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[13]See In re Vianese, 192 B.R. 61, 71 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1996) for a case that uses a 19% threshold, and In Re Lipford, 397 B.R. 320 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 2008) and In re Boule 415 B.R. 1 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2009) for a review of different court practices.

[14]Some courts use a list, known as the Green factors from 934 F.2d 568 (4th Cir. 1991), to determine abuse. In addition to ability to pay, these factors include whether the bankruptcy petition was filed due to sudden illness, calamity, disability, or unemployment; if the debtor incurred cash advances and consumer purchases beyond their ability to repay; if the proposed family budget is excessive or unreasonable; if the debtor's financial statements accurately reflect their true financial condition; and if the petition was filed in good faith (Mitchell, 1997).

Evidence of Screening and Heterogeneity

To motivate our later analysis, we provide descriptive statistics on the importance of eligibility screening and its geographic heterogeneity, focusing on the primary measure of ability to repay in the totality test: debtors' monthly disposable incomes.[15] First, we show that access to Chapter 7 is screened based on debtors' ability to pay, and that this screening affects chapter choice. Both the means test and the totality test prevent debtors who are able to pay from filing under Chapter 7. Consistent with this, the national average line in Figure 1(a) shows that once monthly disposable income becomes positive, Chapter 7 cases are much more likely to be dismissed or converted to Chapter 13. The risk of dismissal also affects chapter choice, as Figure 1(b) shows that the share of bankruptcies under Chapter 7 declines precipitously around the same disposable income threshold.[16] These patterns are not solely due to the means test, as the figures remain similar when the sample is restricted to only below-median-income debtors, all of whom automatically pass the means test (Online Appendix Figure A2).

Second, there is significant geographic heterogeneity in eligibility screening across court districts. For both dismissals and chapter choice, Figure 1 also plots the 10th and 90th percentiles of the cross-district averages. There is extreme variation. In Figure 1(a), the share of cases with \$400 in monthly disposable income that are dismissed varies from 15% of cases in the 90th percentile district to 1.7% of cases in the 10th percentile district. Similarly, among cases with \$400 in disposable income, the share under Chapter 7 varies from 51% in the 90th percentile district to 4.6% in the 10th percentile district. Our goal is to incorporate eligibility screening and geographic heterogeneity in its implementation within a model of chapter choice.

3 Model and Empirical Strategy

This section introduces the model of eligibility screening and chapter choice, then discusses estimation and identification. In the first stage, the debtor chooses to file under Chapter 7 or Chapter 13. In the second stage, the court district's trustees and judges (hereafter "the district")

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[15]Disposable income is calculated as the difference between the debtor's monthly income (Schedule I) and expenses (Schedule J).

[16]In contrast, Chapter 13 dismissals and conversions rise once disposable income becomes negative (see Online Appendix Figure A1).

decide whether to permit the filing under the chosen chapter or deem it ineligible, leading to dismissal or conversion. We refer to this as *eligibility screening*. Debtors account for expected screening when making their chapter choice in stage one. Our model focuses on chapter choice *conditional on filing*; we discuss the implications of not modeling the initial filing decision at the end of this section.

3.1 Eligibility Screening

The district's second-stage eligibility decision is modeled as a district-chapter-specific logit. The probability that a debtor is deemed eligible depends on their characteristics and the district's local screening practices. We adopt a static model that allows for cross-district variation in screening but not temporal variation within districts, consistent with research showing that local legal culture is stable over time (Braucher, 1993; Sullivan *et al.*, 1994; American Bankruptcy Institute, 2019).

The district's eligibility decision is non-strategic and stochastic from the perspective of the debtor (as in Eraslan *et al.* (2017)). For a debtor with eligibility-related characteristics X^E, let the probability that the debtor will be deemed eligible for chapter $C \in \{7, 13\}$ in district d be $Q_C(X^E; \beta_d, \gamma_d)$, which takes the functional form

$$Q_C\left(X^E; \beta_d, \gamma_d\right) = \frac{\exp\left[q_C\left(X^E; \beta_d, \gamma_d\right)\right]}{1 + \exp\left[q_C\left(X^E; \beta_d, \gamma_d\right)\right]} \tag{1}$$

where

$$
\begin{aligned}
q_C\left(X^E; \beta_d, \gamma_d\right) = {}& \beta_0^{Cd} + \beta_1^{Cd}\texttt{disp\_income} + \beta_2^{Cd}\texttt{pct\_repay5} + \beta_3^{Cd}\texttt{incdropbig} \\
& + \beta_4^{Cd}\texttt{expense\_gap} + \beta_5^{Cd}\texttt{prose} + \beta_6^{Cd}\texttt{joint\_file} \\
& + \gamma_0^{Cd}\texttt{AMI} + \gamma_1^{Cd}\texttt{AMI} \times \texttt{disp\_income} + \gamma_2^{Cd}\texttt{AMI} \times \texttt{pct\_repay5} + \gamma_3^{Cd}\texttt{AMI} \times \texttt{incdropbig} \\
& + \gamma_4^{Cd}\texttt{AMI} \times \texttt{expense\_gap} + \gamma_6^{Cd}\texttt{AMI} \times \texttt{joint\_file} + \gamma_7^{Cd}\texttt{amt\_above\_means}
\end{aligned}
$$

The parameters $\beta_d = (\beta^{7d}, \beta^{13d})$ and $\gamma_d = (\gamma^{7d}, \gamma^{13d})$ are chapter-specific coefficient vectors governing eligibility screening in district d, with β_d capturing the totality test and γ_d capturing BAPCPA's means test. Since each chapter has distinct eligibility criteria, a debtor could be eligible for both or neither, so $Q_7 + Q_{13}$ need not equal one. The key feature of our approach is that these coefficients

vary across districts, allowing the same debtor characteristics to yield different eligibility probabilities depending on where the case is filed. This cross-district heterogeneity in screening is central to our analysis.

The variables capture primary factors used in eligibility screening (Section 2). For the totality test (β_d coefficients), the main factor is ability to pay, measured by monthly disposable income (`disp_income`) or share of debt repayable in a hypothetical five-year plan (`pct_repay5`). Secondary factors include whether bankruptcy was caused by a sudden shock (proxied by `incdropbig`, an indicator for a recent income drop exceeding $500) and reasonableness of the budget (`expense_gap`, the gap between actual and IRS standard expenses). We also include indicators for pro se filings and joint filings. Online Appendix Tables A2 and A3 provide detailed variable definitions.

BAPCPA's means test is captured by the γ_d coefficients. Recall that below-median-income debtors automatically pass the means test, while above-median-income debtors may fail if their disposable income is too high and they cannot rebut the presumption of abuse. We capture these rules by including an indicator for above-median income, `AMI`, and interacting it with the totality test covariates.[17] We exclude the `AMI` $\times$ `prose` interaction due to small cell sizes.[18] We also interact `AMI` with `amt_above_means`, the gap between the debtor's income and the state median, to allow for the means test being more binding farther from the median.

Our interpretation attributes within-district screening differences among above-median-income debtors (i.e., $\gamma_d \neq 0$) to the means test. Estimating separate models for each chapter and district provides a check: since the means test does not screen Chapter 13, the `AMI` variables should have little effect on Chapter 13 eligibility.

3.2 Chapter Choice

We now turn to the first-stage chapter choice model, where debtors decide in which chapter to file taking the preceding eligibility model as given. Debtors (or their attorneys) are aware of the eligibility rules in their district (β_d, γ_d) and account for expected eligibility, $Q_C(X^E; \beta_d, \gamma_d)$, when deciding between Chapter 7 and Chapter 13. Ineligibility (dismissal or conversion) is costly

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[17]We apply single-person median income for single filers and two-person median for joint filers since we do not observe household size. Online Appendix C investigates robustness to other measures.

[18]Only 0.67% of cases are AMI pro se, mostly in Chapter 7. Thirty of 83 districts have fewer than 10 above-median-income pro se Chapter 13 cases, and there is complete separation in several districts.

so debtors and their attorneys seek to avoid them. For debtors, the costs include delays and additional attorney fees if they wish to refile. For attorneys, the costs include uncompensated work and professional repercussions.[19]

Consider the choice of a debtor in district d with characteristics $X = (X^E, X^C)$, where X^C are observed characteristics relevant for the debtor's payoffs in Chapter 7 or Chapter 13. X^C may overlap with X^E, the eligibility characteristics. Let U_7 and U_{13} be utility from eligible filings under each chapter. The debtor compares expected utility, accounting for expected eligibility under each chapter, and files under Chapter 7 if

$$Q_7^d(X^E)U_7(X^C) + \left[1 - Q_7^d(X^E)\right]U_0(X^C) \geq Q_{13}^d(X^E)U_{13}(X^C) + \left[1 - Q_{13}^d(X^E)\right]U_0(X^C) \quad (2)$$

where $Q_C^d(X^E) \equiv Q_C(X^E; \beta_d, \gamma_d)$. $U_0(X^C)$ represents the utility when the initial filing is deemed ineligible.[20] This utility reflects the value of the best available option to a debtor with characteristics X^C after ineligibility: refiling under the same chapter, refiling or converting under the other chapter, postponing bankruptcy, or exiting bankruptcy altogether.

The key restriction on $U_0(X^C)$ is that it does not depend on the initial chapter. This restriction is plausible because ineligibility is determined shortly after filing, before the initial chapter choice can meaningfully alter the debtor's circumstances. Instead, post-dismissal options are primarily determined by debtor characteristics X^C, e.g., their income, assets, and debts. Direct costs incurred (filing fees, pre-petition attorney fees) are similar across chapters (Lupica, 2013), and debtors face the same menu of options regardless of initial choice: exit bankruptcy, postpone, convert, or refile under either chapter.[21]

A second restriction is that $U_0(X^C)$ does not vary across districts. This is defensible because the primary determinants of post-dismissal options – income, assets, debts – are debtor characteristics rather than local factors. Relative to debtor characteristics, district-specific differences likely play a small role. Additionally, our chapter choice model partially relaxes this assumption by in-

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[19]Legal research emphasizes the close connections with the bankruptcy bar and that trustees and judges can influence or punish lawyers with clients filing under the "wrong" chapter (Sullivan *et al.*, 1994; Braucher, 1993). For example, Braucher (1993) discusses how attorneys learn the informal minimum requirements for Chapter 13 plans and then rarely file plans that do not meet these minimums.

[20]Note that $U_0(X^C)$ does *not* represent the option of never filing for bankruptcy in the first place, which is not part of our model.

[21]Conversion is economically similar to dismissal followed by refiling under the other chapter. Hynes and Pattison (2025) documents that many dismissed Chapter 13 cases attempt to refile under Chapter 13.

cluding district fixed effects, which capture common district-specific factors that shift the baseline attractiveness of filing under Chapter 7 relative to Chapter 13.

We parametrize these utilities as linear functions of observed characteristics X^C and unobserved factors ϵ

$$
\begin{aligned}
U_7(X^C) &= X^C \delta^7, \\
U_{13}(X^C) &= X^C \delta^{13} + \epsilon \\
U_0(X^C) &= 0
\end{aligned}
\tag{3}
$$

where the utility of the ineligibility outcome is normalized to zero.[22] The parameters δ^7 and δ^{13} measure the utilities of Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 relative to dismissal. We specify

$$
\begin{aligned}
X^C \delta^C = \ &\delta_0^C + \delta_1^C \texttt{avgmnthi} + \delta_2^C \texttt{cntmnthi} + \delta_3^C \texttt{debt\_to\_income} + \delta_4^C \texttt{assets\_to\_income} \\
&+ \delta_5^C \texttt{unsec} + \delta_6^C \texttt{sh\_secured} + \delta_7^C \texttt{sh\_nondischarge} \\
&+ \delta_8^C \texttt{homeowner} + \delta_9^C \texttt{sh\_real} + \delta_{10}^C \texttt{pos\_equity} + \delta_{11}^C \texttt{neg\_equity} + \delta_{12}^C \texttt{nonexempt\_equity} \\
&+ \delta_{13}^C \texttt{pct\_black} + \delta_{14}^C \texttt{joint\_file} + \delta_{15}^C \texttt{incdropbig} + \delta_{16}^C \texttt{AMI}.
\end{aligned}
\tag{4}
$$

The variables reflect the key trade-off in chapter choice: Chapter 7 offers immediate debt discharge but requires surrendering nonexempt assets, while Chapter 13 allows debtors to retain assets by committing to a repayment plan. Debtors with assets to protect, secured debts to restructure, or nondischargeable obligations tend to prefer Chapter 13. Following existing models (Domowitz and Sartain, 1999; Lefgren *et al.*, 2010; Zhu, 2011; Lawless and Littwin, 2017), we include the primary debtor characteristics governing the chapter choice decision.[23] We include a debtor's "average" (`avgmnthi`) and "current" (`cntmnthi`) monthly income. These are the two calculations of income defined in the bankruptcy code; they measure the debtor's monthly income at the time of filing and the debtor's monthly income over the last six months, respectively.[24] We also include

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[22]This normalization is equivalent to assuming that the observed characteristics capture the utility difference between a successful case and dismissal, i.e., $U_7(X^C) - U_0(X^C) = X^C \delta^7$ and $U_{13}(X^C) - U_0(X^C) = X^C \delta^{13}$.

[23]The exact variables and functional forms vary across the models in the literature, but key aspects are the debtor's income, the breakdown between secured and unsecured credit, and homeownership. The important chapter choice variables that we lack are whether the debtor uses a specialist attorney (Lefgren *et al.*, 2010) and the amount of medical debt (Zhu, 2011).

[24]Confusingly, the Bankruptcy Code defines "current monthly income" as the average income over the last six

general characteristics about the debtor's debts and assets – secured debt, homeownership, nondischargeable debts, and nonexempt assets – that may cause a debtor to prefer Chapter 13. Given evidence of racial steering in bankruptcy, we include the share of residents in a zip code that is black (`pct_black`). We add eligibility variables that may also affect chapter choice: joint filing, income drop, and above-median income. The `AMI` indicator captures BAPCPA's direct effects on above-median-income debtors apart from eligibility.[25]

The error term ϵ represents factors that are unobserved to the econometrician but are known by the debtors and affect the value of Chapter 13 relative to Chapter 7. We assume that these consist of district-specific factors affecting all debtors, such as other aspects of local legal culture, and an idiosyncratic error so that $\epsilon = -\delta_d - \tilde{\epsilon}$, where δ_d is a full set of district fixed effects, and $\tilde{\epsilon}$ follows a standard logistic distribution. By including district fixed effects, we expand on chapter choice models that impose a common intercept across districts (Domowitz and Sartain, 1999; Zhu, 2011), and match Lawless and Littwin (2017) which includes district-specific fixed effects to capture important aspects of local legal culture.

Applying these functional forms to the expected utility comparison in equation (2), debtor i in district d with characteristics (X_i^E, X_i^C) chooses Chapter 7 if the following holds:[26]

$$Q_{id}(\beta_d, \gamma_d) \times X_i^C \delta^7 - X_i^C \delta^{13} + \delta_d + \tilde{\epsilon}_{id} > 0 \tag{5}$$

where $Q_{id}(\beta_d, \gamma_d) \equiv \frac{Q_7(X_i^E; \beta_d, \gamma_d)}{Q_{13}(X_i^E; \beta_d, \gamma_d)}$ is the ratio of expected eligibility in Chapter 7 to Chapter 13 for individual i in district d. Higher values indicate greater expected eligibility for Chapter 7 relative to Chapter 13. Note that Q_{id} is interacted with each utility variable. If $Q_{id}(\beta_d, \gamma_d)$ is known, equation (5) can be estimated using standard logit.

Our goal is to understand how chapter choice responds to eligibility screening. The object of interest, therefore, is the marginal effect of the eligibility ratio $Q_{id}(\beta_d, \gamma_d)$ on chapter choice, $\frac{\partial \Pr(C=7)}{\partial Q}$. We also consider the elasticity of chapter choice with respect to the eligibility ratio, $\frac{\partial \Pr(C=7)}{\partial Q} \frac{Q}{\Pr(C=7)}$.[27] These quantities characterize how sensitive chapter choice is to eligibility screen-

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months and "average monthly income" on Schedule I as the monthly income at the time of filing.

[25] Post-BAPCPA, above-median-income debtors face higher fees, must file five-year plans, and use IRS allowable standards.

[26] This substitutes equation (3) into (2) and divides by $Q_{13}^d(X^E)$.

[27] Assume $\tilde{\epsilon}$ follows a standard logistic distribution. For brevity, we suppress the dependence of chapter choice

ing, which determines the scope for local screening practices to shape filing patterns.

To summarize, the model has two components. First, district-specific eligibility screening determines Q_7 and Q_{13}, the probabilities that a debtor is deemed eligible for each chapter. Second, debtors choose chapters to maximize expected utility, weighing the benefits of each chapter against the risk of ineligibility. The key parameters are the eligibility coefficients (β_d, γ_d), which vary by district, and the utility parameters (δ^7, δ^{13}), which are common across districts. Estimation proceeds in two stages, which we now describe.

3.3 Identification and Estimation

We estimate the model by maximum likelihood in two stages.[28] First, we estimate separate eligibility logit models for each district-chapter combination following equation (1). The dependent variable is a binary indicator equal to one if a filing under Chapter C is allowed to proceed and zero if it is either dismissed or converted shortly after filing. We estimate β_d^7 and γ_d^7 using eligibility outcomes for the subsample of Chapter 7 bankruptcy filings in district d and β_d^{13} and γ_d^{13} using the eligibility outcomes for the subsample of Chapter 13 debtors in district d. From these estimates, we generate $Q_{id}(\hat{\beta}_d, \hat{\gamma}_d)$, the eligibility ratio for debtor i in district d.

Since $Q_{id}(\hat{\beta}_d, \hat{\gamma}_d)$ depends on the parameter vector in both chapters, this step uses the Chapter 7 model to form counterfactual predictions for Chapter 13 filers, and vice versa. We thus assume exogenous selection conditional on observed covariates – no unobserved determinants of chapter choice correlated with the stochastic portion of eligibility screening. We observe the most salient eligibility factors, so the role of unobserved attributes affecting both chapter choice and screening outcomes should be limited.

Second, we estimate a single logit model of chapter choice pooling data from all districts following equation (5). The dependent variable is a binary indicator equal to one if a debtor files under Chapter 7 and zero if under Chapter 13. Letting $G(\cdot)$ be the cumulative distribution function of

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$P \equiv \Pr(C = 7)$ and the eligibility ratio Q on characteristics (X^C, X^E). The marginal effect from a change in the eligibility ratio is given by $\frac{\partial P}{\partial Q} = X^C \delta^7 P(1 - P)$ and averaging this over all debtors produces the average marginal effect. Similarly, the elasticity of chapter choice with respect to eligibility is $\epsilon_Q = \frac{\partial P}{\partial Q} \frac{Q}{P} = X^C \delta^7 (1 - P)Q$, which is then averaged over all debtors. Because the elasticity of Q with respect to Q_7 is 1, and the elasticity with respect to Q_{13} is -1, ϵ_Q can be interpreted as the elasticity of chapter choice with respect to either Chapter 7 eligibility or, if multiplied by negative 1, Chapter 13 eligibility.

[28]Joint estimation could yield efficiency gains, but separate first-stage estimation for each district provides significant computational advantages. Given the large sample size, efficiency is not a concern.

a standard logistic distribution and $X_i = (X_i^E, X_i^C)$, equation (5) implies that the probability of choosing Chapter 7 is

$$\Pr(C_i = 7 | X_i, d) = G \left[Q_{id}(\beta_d, \gamma_d) X_i^C \delta^7 - X_i^C \delta^{13} + \delta_d \right].$$ (6)

where $Q_{id}(\beta_d, \gamma_d)$ is replaced with the predicted eligibility ratios generated from the first-stage estimates, $Q_{id}(\hat{\beta}_d, \hat{\gamma}_d)$.

Several comments are warranted. First, δ^7 and δ^{13} are separately identified as long as $Q_{id}(\cdot)$ varies in the sample. If debtors were always eligible for both chapters (as assumed in existing chapter choice models), $Q_7^d = Q_{13}^d = 1$, and only $\delta^7 - \delta^{13}$ would be identified. Empirically, $Q_{id}(\cdot)$ varies across debtors (via X^E) and districts (via $\hat{\beta}_d, \hat{\gamma}_d$). Additionally, exclusion restrictions exist: some variables in X^E are not in X^C.[29] Second, district fixed effects do not cause incidental parameters problems since d is small (83) while i is large. Third, we impose a lower bound of 0.1 on $Q^{13}(\cdot)$ (affecting 0.00056% of observations) to prevent Q_{id} from exploding. Fourth, standard errors are bootstrapped to account for the generated regressors (Online Appendix D).

Finally, we do not model the initial decision to file for bankruptcy. Prior studies that model both decisions use data from the Survey of Consumer Finances, which contains filers and non-filers but lacks the sample size and geographic identifiers needed for our analysis (Domowitz and Sartain, 1999; Zhu, 2011). Our data (discussed in Section 4) contain the universe of filers with detailed case information and geographic coverage, but no non-filers. Although we do not model the decision to file, our estimates remain consistent within a nested logit framework. Sequential estimation of the lower-level nest – here, chapter choice – yields consistent estimates under the nested logit framework (Hensher, 1986; Greene, 2003).

4   Data and Descriptive Statistics

Our data come from the Federal Judicial Center's Integrated Database (IDB), which provides case-level information on all U.S. bankruptcy filings since fiscal year 2008. The IDB includes demographic information, financial characteristics from bankruptcy schedules, and case outcomes,

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[29]Without exclusions, identification of both terms remains from the interaction of X_i^C with the generated regressor Q_{id} and functional form variation.

making it well-suited to study eligibility screening and chapter choice. To focus on geographic variation in eligibility screening and chapter choice, we impose several sample restrictions. First, we restrict to new consumer Chapter 7 or Chapter 13 cases filed in fiscal years 2011–2015. Stopping in 2015 allows us to observe whether Chapter 13 plans were successfully completed. Second, we exclude eleven federal court districts: U.S. territories (small samples) and Alabama and North Carolina, which use a different type of bankruptcy administrator (not trustees) whose screening procedures are less well documented (Wells *et al.*, 1991). Third, we exclude cases with missing data (5.4% of cases), extreme financial values, or Chapter 13 ineligibility due to debt limits.[30] We also exclude outliers in monthly disposable income (outside $[-\$2,000, \$2,000]$), which removes 3.9% of cases, and cases dismissed for failure to pay the filing fee or file required information.[31]

Finally, we restrict the sample to debtors with positive monthly disposable income. This restriction is central to our focus on geographic variation: among positive-income filers, the Chapter 7 filing rate varies from less than 20% to more than 80% across districts, whereas negative-income filers face effectively no variation (Online Appendix Figure A3).[32] The final sample contains 2,489,171 cases of which 53% filed under Chapter 7.

Having constructed our sample, we now describe the key variables. Our primary dependent variables are chapter choice (Chapter 7 vs. Chapter 13) and eligibility screening outcomes. We classify a case as *ineligible* if it is dismissed or converted shortly after filing, indicating that the court or trustee deemed the debtor ineligible for the filed chapter.[33] Overall, 1.7% of Chapter 7 cases and 5.7% of Chapter 13 cases are classified as ineligible under this definition.

Table 1 lists the dependent and explanatory variables and reports summary statistics separately for Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 filers. To reduce the influence of extreme outliers, all financial variables are winsorized at the 99th percentile. The first panel covers variables related to eligibility.

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[30]We retain cases where total liabilities and assets are between \$1,000 and \$5,000,000, average monthly income and expenses are positive and below \$50,000, and debts are below Chapter 13 limits as of 2013 (approximately \$380,000 in unsecured debt and \$1.15 million in secured debt). These restrictions exclude 4.3% of cases.

[31]These dismissals reflect payment or administrative issues unrelated to case characteristics. In robustness checks, we show results are not sensitive to excluding these cases.

[32]The cross-district variance in chapter choice is 40 times larger among positive-income filers. Negative-income filers cannot make payments to creditors and thus are effectively restricted to Chapter 7—indeed, 96.8% file under Chapter 7 (Figure 1b).

[33]For Chapter 7, where cases typically last only a few months, we include any dismissal or conversion. For Chapter 13, where over half of cases are eventually dismissed (mostly due to missed payments), we include only dismissals or conversions within four months of filing to focus on eligibility-related outcomes rather than later non-compliance or missed Chapter 13 payments. The majority of dismissals do not specify a reason (Online Appendix Table A1).

For the totality test, the key determinants are (i) the debtor's monthly disposable income (Schedule I income less Schedule J expenses)[34] and (ii) the share of unsecured debt that could be repaid over a five-year plan.[35] For the means test, the key factor is whether the debtor's income exceeds the state median. We construct an indicator for above-median-income (AMI) using a one-person household for single filers and a two-person household for joint filers.[36]

The second panel covers additional variables affecting chapter choice beyond eligibility, including the debtor's overall financial situation (debts and assets), homeownership, home equity, and nonexempt assets. For nonexempt equity, we follow Pattison and Hynes (2020) and calculate home equity net of the applicable homestead exemption.[37] We also include the ratio of the filer's personal (non-real-estate) assets to annual income as a proxy for other nonexempt assets. Consistent with expectations, Chapter 7 filers have lower disposable income, are less likely to be homeowners, and have less nonexempt equity. Racial differences in chapter choice also exist, with Chapter 7 filers more likely to reside in zip codes with a lower share of Black residents.

5 Results

5.1 Eligibility Model

To begin, we discuss the results from the model for chapter eligibility given in equation (1). We focus our discussion around two questions. First, how important are the totality test and means test in determining eligibility? Second, how much does the implementation of eligibility screening under the two tests vary across different federal court districts? The first question is answered through examination of the statistical and economic significance of the (β_d, γ_d) estimates. The second question is answered through examination of the cross-district heterogeneity in the (β_d, γ_d) estimates.

Table 2 reports the coefficient estimates and marginal effects (MEs). Panel A reports the

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[34]This is the standard measure used by trustees to assess ability to pay; see Wells *et al.* (1991). We adjust for conduit districts as discussed in Online Appendix B.

[35]Calculated as $(60 \times$ disposable income $-$ priority unsecured debt$)$/nonpriority unsecured debt.

[36]Because we do not observe household size, we classify debtors as below-median if their income falls below the minimum applicable threshold. Online Appendix C provides additional details and robustness checks.

[37]Specifically, nonexempt equity equals max{real property value $-$ secured debt $-$ homestead exemption, 0}, applying the married exemption to joint filers and the federal exemption if it is higher and available. We use exemption data from Indarte (2023).

coefficients for below-median-income debtors, i.e., the β estimates and the associated MEs. These represent the effect of the totality test alone because below-median-income debtors automatically pass the means test. Panel B reports the coefficients for above-median-income debtors, i.e., the estimates of $\beta + \gamma$ and the associated MEs. These represent the combined effect of the totality test and the means test. In both panels, the MEs are for a hypothetical debtor with an eligibility probability of $\hat{Q}_C = 0.95$ for $C = 7, 13$, which matches (approximately) the mean eligibility rates in the full sample ($\bar{\hat{Q}}_7 = 0.956$ and $\bar{\hat{Q}}_{13} = 0.936$). These mean predicted values are lower than the observed eligibility rates in Table 1 because the predictions include counterfactual eligibility estimates for filers under the chapter they did not choose.

As a benchmark, we begin with the Chapter 7 eligibility results from a model estimated on the full national sample (i.e., pooling all districts together). We find that both the totality test (applied to all debtors) and the means test (applied to above-median income debtors) restrict eligibility in Chapter 7. The totality test primarily screens on ability to pay, measured by monthly disposable income (`disp_income`) and the percentage of debt that would be repaid over a five-year plan (`pct_repay5`). In Panel A column (1), both of these variables are statistically significant at the 1% level. The corresponding MEs indicate that an additional \$1,000 in monthly disposable income or the ability to repay 100% of unsecured debt over a five-year plan (relative to repaying 0%) reduces eligibility by 4-5 percentage points (pp), which doubles the probability of ineligibility for the average filer. Among the other variables in Panel A, filing pro se is most important; it sharply reduces the probability of eligibility, consistent with some prior estimates (Norberg and Velkey, 2005). Panel B reports estimates for above-median debtors, who are subject to both the totality test and the means test. The coefficients and MEs of `disp_income` and `pct_repay5` are more negative for above-median debtors than below-median debtors, reflecting the additional restrictions of the means test. The differences in the coefficient magnitudes between above- and below-median-income debtors are statistically significant at the 5% level.

We next turn to geographic heterogeneity in the implementation of the totality test and means test. Columns (3) and (4) report the 10th and 90th percentiles of the MEs across the 83 district-specific Chapter 7 eligibility models, revealing significant differences across districts. In Panel A, the MEs of the two ability to pay measures under the totality test vary by an order of magnitude across districts, ranging from a reduction in eligibility of 8-10pp (10th percentile) to a reduction of

1pp or less (90th percentile). In Panel B, there is similar heterogeneity for above-median debtors, which reflects the combined impact of the totality test and the means test.

Panel C isolates the net effect of the means test. Specifically, we report the average marginal effect (AME) of the means test, defined as the average difference in predicted eligibility when $\texttt{AMI} = 1$ compared to when $\texttt{AMI} = 0$, calculated over either the full national sample or the sample of above-median filers. Focusing on the above-median filers, the means test reduces expected eligibility for Chapter 7 by 6.8pp in the national model. In district-specific models, however, the AME varies from -14.6pp to -3.8pp. When we calculate the *district-specific* AMEs, we take the average over the *national* sample of above-median debtors, so all cross-district differences in the AMEs arise solely from heterogeneity in the estimated parameters. Thus, despite being mostly formulaic, the means test's impact varied widely across districts.[38]

Lastly, we consider estimates from the Chapter 13 eligibility model in columns (5)-(8). The Chapter 13 results serve as a falsification check: because the means test does not apply to Chapter 13, variables capturing this mechanism should have little impact on Chapter 13 eligibility. Panel C confirms this – the estimated effect of the means test is essentially zero in the national model and the district-specific estimates are small and clustered around zero. The signs of other coefficients also align with expectations: the ability to repay a greater percentage of debt is associated with *increased* eligibility under Chapter 13 in most districts, contrasting with Chapter 7 where both ability to repay and disposable income reduce eligibility. In summary, our eligibility screening estimates are consistent with the expected applications of the totality test and means test, while revealing significant cross-district heterogeneity.

5.2   Chapter Choice Model

We now turn to the results from the model for chapter choice given in equation (6). Again, we focus our discussion around two questions. First, do debtor characteristics differentially affect the benefits from filing under Chapter 7 versus under Chapter 13? Second, are debtors forward-looking and incorporate eligibility into their chapter choice decision calculus? The first question

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[38]Because we do not perfectly observe household size, above-median-income status ($\texttt{AMI}$), which uses the median income conditional on household size, is measured with error. Our baseline indicator uses one-person households for single filers and two-person households for joint filers. In Online Appendix C, we show that results are robust to alternative measures, including different thresholds and an independent measure available for a subset of districts. District-specific AMEs of the means test are highly correlated across measures (correlations range from 0.81 to 0.92).

is answered through examination of the heterogeneity in the estimates of (δ^7, δ^{13}). The second question is answered through the responsiveness of chapter choice to the eligibility ratio, Q.

The estimates are reported in Table 3. The table contains the coefficient estimates, $(\hat{\delta}^7, \hat{\delta}^{13})$, along with their difference and the statistical significance of the difference. We also report the AMEs of the covariates and the eligibility ratio. In nearly all cases, we easily reject the null of equality between δ^7 and δ^{13}. These coefficients reflect the impact of the covariate on the utility of an eligible filing relative to dismissal, with positive coefficients increasing the value of an eligible filing relative to dismissal. The difference $\delta^7 - \delta^{13}$ in column (5) captures how each characteristic shifts chapter choice preferences: negative values indicate a preference for Chapter 13, positive values for Chapter 7. As expected, debtors with more secured debt, nondischargeable debt, or nonexempt home equity prefer Chapter 13, consistent with its advantages for retaining collateral and restructuring obligations. The nonexempt equity effect is particularly large (AME of -2.16pp), reflecting the strong incentive to use Chapter 13 to protect assets that would otherwise be liquidated under Chapter 7. Conversely, joint filers and those with a recent income drop show a modest preference for Chapter 7.

While the individual estimates are of interest, our primary focus is on the responsiveness of chapter choice to changes in expected eligibility. The bottom row in Table 3 reports the AME of a change in the eligibility ratio, Q, which is the ratio of expected eligibility under Chapter 7 to expected eligibility under Chapter 13.[39] The estimate indicates that, for the average filer, a 1pp increase in the Chapter 7 eligibility probability increases the probability of filing Chapter 7 by 1.84pp. This effect translates to an average elasticity of chapter choice with respect to Q of 4.98, indicating that a 1% increase in Chapter 7 eligibility (or a 1% decrease in Chapter 13 eligibility) raises the probability of filing for Chapter 7 by 4.98%. Given this sensitivity to eligibility, cross-district heterogeneity in screening practices will strongly influence chapter choice.

Figure 2 shows the cross-district variation in screening and its impact on chapter choice. Figure 2(a) shows a histogram of districts' predicted eligibility ratio for a debtor with the average characteristics from the national sample, $\bar{X}$. The predicted eligibility ratio, Q, ranges from 0.954 to 1.19, indicating that some districts view this representative debtor as more suited for Chapter 13 (ratio < 1), whereas others view the debtor as more suited for Chapter 7 (ratio > 1). This variation is

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[39]The formulas for the marginal effect of Q and the elasticity of chapter choice with respect to Q are in Section 3.

due to differences in both Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 screening across districts, which we examine separately in Section 6. Figure 2(b) shows the effect of these changes in eligibility screening on chapter choice. The cross-district variation in the eligibility ratio changes the probability that a debtor with characteristics $\bar{X}$ files under Chapter 7 from less than 50% (when $Q = 0.954$) to more than 70% (when $Q = 1.19$).

The large response to eligibility may seem surprising because dismissal or conversion is relatively rare; as mentioned previously, Table 1 shows that only 1.7% of Chapter 7 and 5.7% of Chapter 13 filed cases are ineligible. However, these ineligibility rates are so low precisely because chapter choice is so responsive to the risk of ineligibility. Debtors who file under Chapter 7 face low dismissal risk, with a mean expected eligibility $\bar{Q}_7$ of 98.3%. In contrast, our model predicts that if those who filed under Chapter 13 had *instead* filed under Chapter 7, they would have faced a much higher dismissal risk, with a mean eligibility $\bar{Q}_7$ of only 89.2%.

6   Geographic Variation in Eligibility Screening and Chapter Choice

This section presents additional analysis of geographic heterogeneity in bankruptcy eligibility screening and its relationship to chapter choice. We provide a brief review of the causes of geographic variation in chapter choice, document the chapter-specific variation in our new factor – dismissal rates – and then examine the correlation between dismissal rates and the geographic variation in chapter choice.

6.1   Related Literature

Geographic variation in chapter choice is large and remarkably persistent. In our sample period, the cross-district Chapter 7 share (share of bankruptcies under Chapter 7) ranges from 22% to 94%. This variation in chapter choice has been largely stable for decades: the correlation between districts' Chapter 7 share in 1990 and 2011–2015 is 0.73, despite major changes in economic conditions and bankruptcy law. As early as the 1960s, scholars documented similar cross-district differences and debated whether they reflected local practices, professional attitudes, or state laws (McDuffee, 1961a; Haden, 1966). These facts suggest that explanations for geographic variation in chapter choice should focus on slow-moving, place-based factors.

A broad empirical literature examines legal, economic, and demographic determinants of bankruptcy filings and chapter choice, many of which have also been persistent over time. These studies identify the importance of legal factors such as attorney fees, exemptions, garnishment protections, and payday lending regulations (McIntyre *et al.*, 2015; Albanesi and Nosal, 2022; Fay *et al.*, 2002; Pattison and Hynes, 2020; Dawsey and Ausubel, 2002; Miller, 2019; Skiba and Tobacman, 2019); economic factors such as unemployment, medical debt, household balance sheets, and liquidity constraints (Keys, 2018; Gross and Notowidigdo, 2011; Dobkin *et al.*, 2018; Foohey *et al.*, 2020; Morrison *et al.*, 2020; Domowitz and Sartain, 1999; Zhu, 2011; Gross *et al.*, 2014; Foohey *et al.*, 2016); and demographic factors, particularly that Black debtors are more likely to file for or be steered into Chapter 13 (Dickerson, 2012; Braucher *et al.*, 2012a,b). However, most of these studies focus on cleanly identifying the causal effect of one specific factor on bankruptcy filing or chapter choice, rather than quantifying how much each factor contributes to the geographic variation in chapter choice.[40]

A smaller set of papers directly examines the correlations between these factors and the geographic variation in bankruptcy filing rates or chapter choice. Lefgren and McIntyre (2009) find that wage garnishment restrictions and the Chapter 13 share (as a proxy for local legal culture) statistically explain much of cross-state filing variation, while exemption levels play little role. Lawless and Littwin (2017) show that race, case characteristics, and district fixed effects account for nearly all explanatory power in a logit model of chapter choice, and Beck *et al.* (2014) emphasize ideological factors, especially Evangelical and Fundamentalist shares, in explaining Chapter 13 usage and the prevalence of Chapter 13 in the South. Overall, these papers suggest that race, garnishment restrictions, and ideology are important, but exemptions matter little and much of the variation remains unexplained.

Using a movers design to more cleanly separate person- and place-based factors, Keys *et al.* (2020) find that only wage garnishment restrictions consistently predict the place-based component of bankruptcy filings. There is little correlation between the place-based component and exemption levels or other covariates capturing legal and economic conditions. Together with qualitative accounts of local legal culture (McDuffee, 1961b; Braucher, 1993; Sullivan *et al.*, 1994), this evidence

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[40]An exception is McIntyre *et al.* (2015), which attributes 5.4% of the cross-district variation in Chapter 13 shares to attorney fees.

points to persistent institutional factors that are not well captured by state laws or observable local conditions. This unexplained variation is often attributed to local legal culture.

An early legal literature, consisting of detailed interviews with bankruptcy professionals, high-lighted the importance of "local legal culture" – how bankruptcy professionals interpret and apply the federal bankruptcy law (Braucher, 1993; Sullivan *et al.*, 1994). Local rules and informal norms would shift the incentives of debtors and attorneys when choosing a chapter. Recent empirical work has begun to examine variation among legal professionals that reflect local legal culture, including judge-level heterogeneity in Chapter 13 dismissals (Dobbie and Song, 2015), attorney specialization (Lefgren *et al.*, 2010), and racial steering by attorneys Braucher *et al.* (2012a,b); Argyle *et al.* (2023) show that trustee race affects Chapter 13 dismissals but not Chapter 7. This paper contributes by documenting systematic cross-district heterogeneity in one aspect of local legal culture, eligibility screening by trustees and judges, and linking it to the longstanding geographic patterns in chapter choice.

6.2   Measuring Geographic Heterogeneity in Eligibility Screening

We examine the cross-district variation in chapter-specific eligibility screening that is captured by the district-specific screening functions $Q_7^d(X^E)$ and $Q_{13}^d(X^E)$. Under these screening functions, eligibility varies across districts and debtor characteristics. To isolate the cross-district variation, we report each district's average predicted dismissal probability $(1 - Q_C^d)$, with the average taken over the full national sample of filers. This measure isolates district-level heterogeneity in the screening functions while keeping the composition of filers constant.

Across districts, there is substantial variation in both Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 screening. Predicted Chapter 7 dismissal rates range from 1.5% (Arizona) to 15.7% (Western District of Louisiana), with a median of 5.6% and an interdecile range (10th-90th) of 2.7% to 9.7%. Chapter 13 dismissal rates exhibit similar dispersion: the median is 4.8%, ranging from 1.2% (Colorado) to 19.6% (California Central), with an interdecile range of 2.1% to 9.2%. As a result, otherwise similar debtors face markedly different dismissal risks depending on where they file.

Figure 3 maps these dismissal rates. Chapter 7 dismissals are elevated in parts of the Deep South, while Chapter 13 dismissals are highest in the West and parts of the Northeast. Overall, however, there are few clear geographic patterns. Moreover, screening stringency across chapters is

only weakly correlated: the correlation between district-level Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 dismissal rates is -0.13 ($p = 0.258$). Districts that screen aggressively under one chapter do not necessarily do so under the other. Some districts (e.g., Middle and Western Districts of Tennessee) have high dismissal rates under both chapters, others have high dismissal rates in one chapter and low dismissal rates in the other (e.g., District of Connecticut and Western District of Missouri), while still others (e.g., District of Colorado) have low dismissal rates under both.

6.3 Screening and the Geography of Chapter Choice

We now examine the degree to which district-level variation in Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 dismissal rates helps explain the geographic heterogeneity in Chapter 7 share. Specifically, we analyze the cross-sectional correlation of the district-level Chapter 7 share (2011-2015) with districts' dismissal rates, as well as a rich set of district and state legal, economic, demographic, and ideological controls drawn from the literature.[41] As with other papers examining the geographic variation, the analysis is correlational and does not necessarily identify causal effects of dismissal rates or other district characteristics on chapter choice.

First, we analyze bivariate and multivariate correlations between Chapter 7 share and each explanatory variable.[42] Figure 4(a) presents bivariate OLS estimates with standardized variables. Chapter 7 dismissal rates have the second-largest bivariate correlation with Chapter 7 share, behind only the share of Black residents. Chapter 13 dismissal rates are only weakly related in bivariate specifications. Many other variables also exhibit strong bivariate correlations. Notably, however, the legal variables (attorney fees, homestead exemptions, wildcard exemptions, and garnishment protection) show little systematic relationship with Chapter 7 share.

In the multivariate regression (panel b), both dismissal rates exhibit strong, statistically significant relationships with Chapter 7 share. A one standard deviation increase in Chapter 7 dismissal rates is associated with a 0.19 standard deviation decrease in the Chapter 7 share ($p < 0.03$), while a one standard deviation increase in Chapter 13 dismissal rates is associated with a 0.20 standard deviation increase in the Chapter 7 share ($p < 0.01$). These are two of only six variables significant

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[41] A complete list of variables, definitions, and data sources is provided in Online Appendix Table E1, along with summary statistics in Online Appendix Table E2.

[42] Both the dependent and independent variables are standardized to mean zero and standard deviation one, so the coefficient magnitudes are comparable across variables.

at the 5% level. Consistent with prior work, garnishment protection and the share of Black residents also exhibit significant associations, while exemptions matter little. Thus, dismissal rates emerge as an important correlate of geographic variation even after controlling for district characteristics identified in prior work.

To quantify the contribution of dismissal rates, we use the Lindeman *et al.* (1980) (LMG) variance decomposition, which partitions the model's R^2 into additive contributions from each regressor group.[43] Table 4 reports results across specifications, with Panel A presenting the coefficients on dismissal rates and Panel B reporting the LMG decomposition. In column (1), dismissal rates, when included alone, explain 22% of variation in Chapter 7 share. As legal, economic, demographic, and ideological variables are separately introduced in columns (2)-(5), the coefficient on Chapter 7 dismissals shrinks but remains significant while the coefficient on Chapter 13 dismissals becomes significant once either demographic or ideological controls are included.

In the full model (column 6), which matches the multivariate results in Figure 4 panel (b), both dismissal rates retain sizable and statistically significant coefficients (-0.19 for Chapter 7 and 0.20 for Chapter 13). Turning to the LMG decomposition, demographic and ideological variables explain the largest shares of overall variation (0.26 and 0.22, respectively), but dismissal rates continue to contribute nontrivially (0.11). The portion attributed to dismissal rates exceeds the combined contribution of all legal variables—attorney fees, exemption levels, and garnishment protections—which together explain only 0.08 of the variation. This indicates that dismissal rates capture new institutional variation that statistically explains a meaningful portion of the geographic variation in chapter choice.

7   Evaluating BAPCPA's Means Test

The 2005 Bankruptcy Reform, BAPCPA, was the largest change to the U.S. bankruptcy code since the 1980s. Its flagship feature, the means test, aimed to shift high-income filers out of Chapter 7 into Chapter 13 (or out of bankruptcy altogether). Identification of the means test's impact is

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[43]The LMG decomposition computes the average marginal contribution of each variable to R^2 across all possible orderings of variables, avoiding order-dependence issues with correlated regressors. This approach has several desirable properties: the contributions of all variables sum to the R^2 of the full model, any variable with a nonzero coefficient in the full model receives a nonzero weight, and the method avoids the negative importance weights that can arise in alternative decompositions Grömping (2007). It is equivalent to a Shapley value decomposition (Lipovetsky and Conklin, 2001).

challenging since BAPCPA was a national policy and it introduced many changes in addition to the means test. We overcome this challenge by using our model to generate counterfactual, district-specific predictions of the impact of the means test on chapter choice. We then compare these model-generated predictions to the actual changes that occurred around the implementation of BAPCPA in 2005. Since the model is estimated using data from 2011-2015, this provides an out-of-sample validation test of the model-generated predictions.

7.1 Model-Generated Impact of the Means Test

Empirical Strategy

Using the estimated model, we generate counterfactual predictions for chapter eligibility and choice by shutting off screening by the means test (setting $\gamma_d = 0$).[44] Differencing the predicted values with and without the means test yields the model-generated impact of the means test on eligibility and chapter choice for each district. Specifically, for debtor i in district d, the effect of the means test on the predicted Chapter C eligibility probability is $Q_C(X_i; \hat{\beta}_d, \hat{\gamma}_d) - Q_C(X_i; \hat{\beta}_d, 0)$, and the predicted impact on the probability of filing for Chapter 7 is $P_7(X_i; \hat{\beta}_d, \hat{\gamma}_d, \hat{\delta}) - P_7(X_i; \hat{\beta}_d, 0, \hat{\delta})$, where $P_7(\cdot)$ denotes the Chapter 7 filing probability from equation (6).

We aggregate these individual-level predictions by averaging over all debtors in each district, forming the predicted district-level impact of the means test on eligibility (ΔQ_C^d) and chapter choice (ΔP_d). The structural model is estimated only on debtors with positive disposable income, and only these debtors are likely to be affected by the means test.[45] As a result, the predicted change in *overall* chapter choice for the district is $\Delta P_d^O = DI_d \Delta P_d$, where DI_d is the share of debtors in district d with positive disposable income. We use these district-level predictions to examine heterogeneity in the means test's impact and, in the following subsection, compare them to observed changes around BAPCPA's implementation as an out-of-sample validation of the model.

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[44]We also zero the coefficient on `AMI` (δ_{16}^C), which captures the means test's restrictions on above-median-income Chapter 13 plans.

[45]We assume that debtors with negative disposable income are unaffected by the means test because 96.8% file under Chapter 7, 74.8% are below-median income, and those with above-median income would almost certainly qualify for Chapter 7 under the expense-based portion of the means test.

Results

Figure 5 (a) shows that the means test reduces eligibility for Chapter 7 in all districts (mean change of -3.1pp). There is significant heterogeneity in the average change in Chapter 7 eligibility probabilities, ranging from -8.4pp to -0.14pp across districts. As expected, there is little effect on eligibility for Chapter 13 (mean change of 0.051pp), and only one district experiences a change larger than 2pp in absolute value. Although Chapter 7 eligibility falls, the average effects are relatively modest for two reasons. Most filers are below the median income and therefore unaffected by the means test. Also, consistent with practitioner accounts (Wedoff, 2005; Littwin, 2016), in some districts, the means test provided little additional screening over the pre-existing totality test.

Figure 5(b) shows that tighter screening in Chapter 7 also reduces the share of bankruptcies in Chapter 7, with the average district's Chapter 7 share falling by 9.6pp. But there is considerable variation across districts (5pp to 20+pp) due to differences in how the means test interacted with the pre-existing totality test and debtor characteristics.

How does the heterogeneity in the means test affect the pre-existing variation in screening? The means test may increase uniformity if it offsets the existing variation in the totality test by bringing all districts up to the same standard. Alternatively, if districts that already tightly screen access to Chapter 7 also implement the means test more strictly, it may exacerbate the geographic variation.[46] The evidence indicates that the means test complements the existing strictness and amplifies pre-existing geographic heterogeneity in screening.

Figure 6(a) plots each district's average Chapter 7 ineligibility probability without the means test ($\gamma_d = 0$) against the change in ineligibility probability from implementing the means test.[47] There is a strong positive correlation (slope 0.38): districts with strict totality tests saw even larger increases in ineligibility rates once the means test was added. Figure 6(b) shows the corresponding effect on Chapter 7 filing rates, with a negative correlation (slope -0.54) – districts with high pre-means-test ineligibility rates experienced larger decreases in Chapter 7 filings.[48] These results are

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[46] As discussed in Section 2, there remains a broad discretionary component to the means test when trustees decide whether mitigating circumstances of the debtor can rebut the presumption of abuse.

[47] In this analysis, we use ineligibility rates, defined as the complement of eligibility: $1 - Q_C$ for chapter C. Ineligibility rates vary more visibly near zero than eligibility rates near one.

[48] The means test has little relation to heterogeneity in Chapter 13 screening. Online Appendix Figure A4 shows essentially no systematic relationship between pre-means-test Chapter 13 ineligibility rates and the means test's impact (slope -0.07).

consistent with persistent, heterogeneous local legal cultures around screening; districts with a stricter interpretation of the totality test also implement a strict interpretation of the means test. Thus, the means test reinforced the pre-existing geographic variation in eligibility screening and chapter choice.

7.2 Comparison to Observed Changes

Empirical Strategy

We now compare the model's predicted impact of the means test – obtained using a 2011-2015 sample when BAPCPA was in effect – to actual district-level changes in chapter choice around the 2005 implementation of BAPCPA. This provides a test of the model's ability to generate out-of-sample predictions under a different policy environment. To proceed, we use the model-predicted change in district d's Chapter 7 share, ΔP_d^O, from the prior section as a covariate in the following specification using district-quarter data from 2001-2019:[49]

$$\texttt{Ch.7}_{dt} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \texttt{Post}_t \times \Delta P_d^O + \delta_d + \tau_t + \texttt{controls}_{dt} + u_{dt} \tag{7}$$

where $\texttt{Ch.7}_{dt}$ is the Chapter 7 share in district d during quarter t, $\texttt{Post}_t$ indicates the post-BAPCPA period (2005Q4+), δ_d and τ_t are district and quarter fixed effects, and $\texttt{controls}_{dt}$ is a vector of controls (described below). If predictions are perfect, $\beta_1 = 1$. We do not expect β_1 to exactly equal one, however, as there will be attenuation bias from measurement error in ΔP_d^O and there are several changes that our model neglects: unmodeled BAPCPA provisions, changes in the composition of filers, and changes in economic conditions.

Results

Table 5 reports results. The baseline (column 1) shows $\beta_1 = 0.52$ (p < 0.01): districts with larger predicted declines experienced larger actual declines. Columns 2-5 add controls for other BAPCPA effects identified in the literature: homestead exemptions (Morgan *et al.*, 2012), state income distributions (Cornwell and Xu, 2014), attorney fees (Lupica, 2012), and pre-BAPCPA

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[49]Quarterly bankruptcies by district are reported in Table F-2 published by the Administrative Office of the United States Courts. We exclude Arkansas because their districts are not reported separately, and we stop our sample before Covid-19. Case-level bankruptcy data published by the FJC are only available for the post-BAPCPA period.

(2003-2004) Chapter 7 shares as a proxy for other aspects of local legal culture (Chakrabarti and Pattison, 2019).[50] Point estimates generally increase as we control for these factors. Thus, as expected, controlling for unmodeled heterogeneity in BAPCPA's impact increases the alignment between the model-generated predictions and the observed changes.

Our preferred specification in column (6) controls for these other aspects of BAPCPA-induced heterogeneity and also allows for flexible, time-varying geographic differences by including region-by-quarter fixed effects for the four Census regions. These controls address concerns that the results are driven by broader shocks to geographic regions, such as the South, where Chapter 13 is most common. With these controls, the coefficient on $\texttt{Post}_t \times \Delta P_d^O$ indicates that a 1pp increase in the predicted impact of the means test on the share of bankruptcies in Chapter 7 is associated with a 0.65pp increase in the district's actual share of bankruptcies under Chapter 7. Moreover, we cannot reject the null that β_1 equals one at conventional levels of statistical significance. In column (7) we also control for the share of bankruptcies with negative disposable income in each district. Recall that $\Delta P_d^O = DI_d \times \Delta P_d$, so the correlation could reflect either variation in the share of filers potentially affected by the means test (DI_d) or variation in the predicted effect among those filers (ΔP_d). The point estimate on $\texttt{Post}_t \times \Delta P_d^O$ is 0.47pp after controlling for DI_d, indicating that the model's predicted impact – not simply the share of positive-disposable-income filers – drives the correlation.

To examine the timing, Figure 7 plots the coefficients from an event study specification.[51] Prior to 2004, there is essentially no relationship between ΔP_d^O and district changes in $\texttt{Ch.7}_{dt}$, though there is slight seasonality in filings that leads to some significant coefficients. There are large, negative coefficients in 2005 Q2-Q4, reflecting that the districts for which our model predicts a large decline in Chapter 7 filings *after* the introduction of the means test experience an increase

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[50]The pre-BAPCPA share under Chapter 7 is similar to a lagged dependent variable model. As such, we do not expect this covariate to be strictly exogeneous which is necessary due to the inclusion of district fixed effects. However, the bias – referred to as Nickell (1981) bias – disappears asymptotically for large T. Because $T = 76$ in our estimation, the issue can be ignored.

[51]Based on the specification in column (1), we estimate

$$\texttt{Ch.7}_{dt} = \alpha_0 + \sum_{k \neq 2003Q1} \gamma_k \Delta P_d^O \times 1[t = k] + \delta_d + \tau_t + \texttt{controls}_{dt} + u_{dt}$$

where we interact the district-specific predicted change ΔP_d^O with quarter fixed effects, omitting the first quarter of 2003 as a reference group. We omit this quarter to make it easier to observe the well-known anticipation effects that occurred in 2005 before BAPCPA went into effect.

in the Chapter 7 cases immediately *before* the law went into effect. This pattern reflects the well-known rush to filing under Chapter 7 and shows that it was most severe in districts where our model predicts the means test to be most binding (Morgan *et al.*, 2012). Finally, once BAPCPA is in effect, the predicted change aligns well with the actual changes, as the estimates vary from roughly 0.25 to 0.75. The timing validates the model's ability to generate out-of-sample predictions for this major policy change.

As further validation, we examine whether the geographic dispersion in Chapter 7 shares increased after BAPCPA, as the model predicts. Consistent with the model, the cross-district standard deviation in Chapter 7 shares increased by 10.2% after BAPCPA, and the coefficient of variation increased by 22.4%. Online Appendix Figure A5 shows that the timing of these increases aligns with BAPCPA's implementation.

In summary, the means test – through its interaction with the totality test and the composition of debtors – created significant geographic variation in its effects across districts. This variation reinforced rather than offset pre-existing geographic differences in bankruptcy screening and chapter choice.

8   Conclusion

This paper develops a model of consumer bankruptcy chapter choice that incorporates two novel features of eligibility screening in bankruptcy: (i) the multiple eligibility tests used by trustees and judges, and (ii) geographic heterogeneity in how these tests are implemented. Using case-level data from 83 court districts, we estimate the parameters governing the eligibility screening tests in each district. The means test and the discretionary totality test materially shape dismissal risk and, through that channel, debtors' initial chapter choices. The estimated screening parameters vary substantially across districts, and predicted dismissal rates differ by an order of magnitude. Crucially, these dismissal differences map directly into persistent geographic variation in Chapter 7 share, even after accounting for standard legal, economic, and demographic covariates.

Our counterfactual analysis of BAPCPA's means test further underscores the importance of implementation heterogeneity. Although the reform was uniform at the federal level, its impact on screening and chapter choice is highly uneven across districts, with negligible effects in some places

and large reductions in Chapter 7 access in others. This unevenness arises because districts with stricter pre-existing screening also tended to implement the means test more strictly, amplifying geographic disparities. The model's district-level predictions closely match observed changes around BAPCPA, providing external validation of the framework.

More broadly, the results highlight how local implementation of federal law can generate inequities in access to debt relief. Screening policies determine who can obtain Chapter 7's fresh start and thus how repayment burdens are distributed across households and creditors. These findings underscore that achieving greater uniformity in bankruptcy—a longstanding policy goal—will require addressing not only substantive law but also the local implementation practices that determine access to relief. More generally, our results demonstrate how decentralized implementation can cause uniform federal policies to produce heterogeneous outcomes and how new federal mandates may amplify rather than reduce pre-existing disparities.

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Table 1: Summary Statistics

variable	definition	Chapter 7		Chapter 13		difference
		mean	std. dev.	mean	std. dev.	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Eligibility Variables						
elig	eligible (%)	98.3	12.8	94.3	23.2	4.0
converted_early	convert shortly after filing (%)	0.8	9.1	0.9	9.6	-0.1
dism_early	dismiss shortly after filing (%)	0.8	9.2	4.8	21.3	-3.9
disp_income	monthly disposable income ($1,000s)	0.1	0.2	0.5	0.4	-0.4
pct_repay5	debt repaid in 60-month plan (%)	13.3	23.6	64.5	37.3	-51.3
incdropbig	income drop at least $200 (%)	43.7	49.6	46.1	49.9	-2.5
expense_gap	actual exp. - IRS standards ($1,000s)	-0.4	1.3	-0.1	1.5	-0.3
prose	pro se filer (%)	4.9	21.6	1.5	12.2	3.4
joint_file	joint filing (%)	31.0	46.3	32.0	46.7	-1.0
AMI	income above median (%)	29.6	45.6	45.2	49.8	-15.6
amt_above_means	amount above median annual inc. ($1,000s)	5.2	11.7	12.3	19.8	-7.1
Chapter Choice Variables						
avgmnthi	average monthly income at filing ($1,000s)	3.0	1.4	3.7	1.8	-0.7
cntmnthi	avg. monthly inc. past 6 months ($1,000s)	3.2	2.1	4.0	2.7	-0.9
debt_to_income	total liabilities over annualized `avgmnthi`	4.2	4.4	4.0	3.4	0.2
assets_to_income	total assets over annualized `avgmnthi`	2.4	3.1	3.0	3.0	-0.6
unsec	unsecured debt ($1,000s)	60.1	56.3	48.0	52.9	12.1
sh_secured	share secured debt (%)	39.3	34.9	60.8	32.1	-21.6
sh_nondischarge	share non-dischargeable debt (%)	6.2	16.1	7.7	17.6	-1.5
homeowner	homeowner (%)	48.2	50.0	67.1	47.0	-19.0
sh_real	real property over total assets (%)	38.0	41.6	53.7	40.3	-15.7
pos_equity	pos. home equity ($1,000s)	4.9	18.2	8.5	25.6	-3.5
neg_equity	neg. home equity ($1,000s)	18.2	42.9	32.0	57.5	-13.8
nonexempt_equity	nonexempt home equity ($1,000s)	0.8	6.9	2.8	12.9	-2.0
pct_black	zip percent Black	13.0	19.5	23.7	27.2	-10.7
irs_expense	IRS local standard exp. ($1,000s)	3.3	0.8	3.3	0.8	0.0
Observations		1,318,558		1,170,613		

Notes: Summary statistics for the consumer bankruptcy cases in the analysis sample. Column 6 reports the difference in means between column (2) and column (4). Online Appendix Tables A2 and A3 provide detailed variable definitions.

Table 2: Eligibility Models

	Chapter 7				Chapter 13			
	National Model		District Models		National Model		District Models	
	Est.	ME	ME (10th)	ME (90th)	Est.	ME	ME (10th)	ME (90th)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
A: Estimates (β) and Marginal Effects for Below-Median Inc. (AMI= 0)								
disp_income	-0.82	-0.040	-0.080	0.002	-0.44	-0.020	-0.040	0.037
	(0.035)				(0.016)			
pct_repay5	-0.97	-0.050	-0.100	-0.010	0.31	0.015	0.000	0.044
	(0.038)				(0.015)			
incdropbig	0.50	0.019	-0.010	0.030	0.54	0.020	-0.010	0.031
	(0.025)				(0.016)			
expense_gap	-0.06	0.000	-0.020	0.004	0.13	0.006	-0.010	0.013
	(0.0088)				(0.0053)			
prose	-1.21	-0.100	-0.270	-0.020	-2.59	-0.360	-0.520	-0.130
	(0.02)				(0.016)			
joint_file	0.09	0.004	-0.030	0.015	0.68	0.024	-0.010	0.026
	(0.022)				(0.015)			
(Intercept)	4.63				2.67			
	(0.015)				(0.012)			
B: Estimates ($\beta + \gamma$) and Marginal Effects for Above-Median Inc. (AMI= 1)								
disp_income	-1.20	-0.060	-0.100	-0.040	-0.40	-0.020	-0.040	0.016
	(0.035)†				(0.017)			
pct_repay5	-1.20	-0.060	-0.110	-0.020	0.49	0.023	0.002	0.059
	(0.044)†				(0.02)†			
incdropbig	0.12	0.005	-0.060	0.023	0.53	0.020	-0.020	0.027
	(0.033)†				(0.02)			
expense_gap	-0.09	0.000	-0.010	0.006	-0.02	0.000	-0.010	0.008
	(0.01)†				(0.0071)†			
joint_file	-0.06	0.000	-0.040	0.010	0.51	0.019	-0.020	0.026
	(0.022)†				(0.016)†			
amt_AMI	-0.04	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.00	0.000	0.000	0.001
	(7e-04)†				(0.00053)			
(Intercept)	5.01				2.57			
	(0.034)†				(0.021)†			
C: Average Marginal Effects of Means Test								
Sample: All		-0.025	-0.057	-0.010		0.000	-0.024	0.019
Sample: Above-Median		-0.068	-0.146	-0.038		-0.007	-0.017	0.015
Observations	1,318,558				1,170,613			

Notes: Logit estimates of eq. (1) for Ch. 7 (cols. 1–4) and Ch. 13 (cols. 5–6). For each chapter, cols. 1–2 show national estimates and marginal effects (ME); cols. 3–4 report the 10th/90th percentiles from 83 district-by-chapter models. MEs are evaluated at $\hat{Q} = 0.95$ (sample mean). Panel A: below-median debtors (β); Panel B: above-median debtors ($\beta + \gamma$). † marks the significance of $\gamma \neq 0$ at the 5% level. Panel C reports the average ME of AMI (means test) for (i) full sample and (ii) above-median debtors.

Table 3: Chapter Choice Model

	Ch.7 coef. (δ_7)		Ch.13 coef. (δ_{13})		$\delta_7 - \delta_{13}$	p-value	AME
	est.	std. err.	est.	std. err.			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
avgmnthi	-0.58	(0.03)	-0.57	(0.03)	-0.01	0.198	-0.00
cntmnthi	-0.38	(0.03)	-0.43	(0.03)	0.05	<0.001	0.01
debt_to_income	-0.05	(0.01)	-0.16	(0.01)	0.11	<0.001	0.02
assets_to_income	-0.03	(0.01)	0.01	(0.01)	-0.04	<0.001	-0.01
unsec	5.68	(0.69)	8.43	(0.72)	-2.75	<0.001	-0.45
sh_secured	-1.16	(0.21)	0.89	(0.22)	-2.05	<0.001	-0.34
sh_nondischarge	-0.32	(0.26)	1.35	(0.28)	-1.67	<0.001	-0.27
homeowner	8.63	(0.58)	8.22	(0.59)	0.41	<0.001	0.10
sh_real	-9.70	(0.63)	-9.57	(0.64)	-0.12	<0.001	-0.02
pos_equity	-13.40	(1.77)	-8.27	(1.81)	-5.13	<0.001	-0.84
neg_equity	-7.26	(0.55)	-2.49	(0.57)	-4.77	<0.001	-0.78
nonexempt_equity	-3.51	(3.51)	9.69	(3.58)	-13.20	<0.001	-2.16
pct_black	0.01	(0)	0.02	(0)	-0.02	<0.001	-0.00
joint_file	13.01	(0.4)	12.92	(0.41)	0.09	<0.001	0.06
incdropbig	9.26	(0.27)	9.10	(0.27)	0.16	<0.001	0.06
irs_expense	-3.60	(0.17)	-3.66	(0.17)	0.06	<0.001	0.01
AMI	2.50	(0.17)	2.68	(0.18)	-0.18	<0.001	-0.02
(Intercept)	17.90	(0.75)	16.06	(0.78)	1.84	<0.001	
AME: Eligibility Ratio $\frac{Q_7}{Q_{13}}$							1.84
Observations			2,489,171				

Notes: Estimates from chapter choice logit model (equation (5)) with an indicator for Chapter 7 as the dependent variable. The model also includes district fixed effects. Columns (1)-(4) report coefficient estimates δ_7 and δ_{13} with bootstrap standard errors (500 samples; see Online Appendix D). Column (5) reports the difference in coefficients and column (6) the bootstrap p-value. Column (7) reports average marginal effects on the probability of filing Chapter 7. "AME: Eligibility Ratio" is the marginal effect of the eligibility ratio $Q = \frac{Q_7}{Q_{13}}$. Income variables are in thousands of dollars; debt and equity variables are in millions. Percent black ranges from 0 to 100.

Table 4: Decomposition of Cross-District Chapter 7 Share

	(1) Screening only	(2) + Legal	(3) + Economic	(4) + Demographic	(5) + Ideology	(6) Full model
A: Coefficients on Dismissal Rates						
Dism. 7	-0.468***	-0.443***	-0.41***	-0.211***	-0.217***	-0.187**
	((0.117))	((0.125))	((0.107))	((0.071))	((0.079))	((0.082))
Dism. 13	0.026	0.014	0.141	0.127*	0.161**	0.199***
	((0.081))	((0.077))	((0.094))	((0.075))	((0.064))	((0.068))
B: Relative Importance of Predictor Groups (R^2 Contributions)						
Screening	0.223	0.199	0.206	0.141	0.149	0.109
Legal	0	0.11	0	0	0	0.077
Economic	0	0	0.283	0	0	0.127
Demographic	0	0	0	0.491	0	0.264
Ideology	0	0	0	0	0.45	0.22
Total R-squared	0.223	0.309	0.489	0.632	0.599	0.797

Notes: Panel A reports coefficient estimates and heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. Panel B reports Shapley-LMG decomposition of R^2, where entries are absolute contributions computed by averaging marginal R^2 improvements across all variable-group orderings. Screening variables (Chapter 7 and 13 dismissal probabilities) are included in all specifications; additional groups are added sequentially. All variables are standardized prior to estimation.

Table 5: Testing Validity of Predicted Means Test Impact

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	Dependent variable:						
	District's Ch. 7 Share						
Post $\times \Delta P_d^O$	0.520***	0.553***	0.459**	0.774***	0.732***	0.648**	0.469**
	(0.152)	(0.154)	(0.169)	(0.245)	(0.253)	(0.250)	(0.229)
unemp. rate	0.539**	0.560**	0.572**	0.455*	0.487*	0.567**	0.500**
	(0.259)	(0.259)	(0.258)	(0.261)	(0.259)	(0.236)	(0.232)
ln(HPI)	−0.042	−0.044	−0.034	−0.046	−0.042	−0.088**	−0.073**
	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.034)	(0.033)	(0.035)	(0.035)
Post $\times$ homestead		−0.011			−0.012	−0.018	−0.020*
		(0.012)			(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.011)
Post $\times$ unl. exemption		0.006			0.004	0.026	0.045**
		(0.014)			(0.016)	(0.023)	(0.022)
Post $\times$ means test			−0.020		−0.025	−0.029	−0.037**
			(0.017)		(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.018)
Post $\times \Delta$fee 7				0.029	0.060	0.047	0.0002
				(0.042)	(0.047)	(0.055)	(0.045)
Post $\times \Delta$fee 13				−0.027*	−0.027*	−0.029*	−0.017
				(0.013)	(0.015)	(0.017)	(0.015)
Post $\times$ pre-Ch.7 sh.				−0.116	−0.116	−0.162**	−0.240***
				(0.087)	(0.080)	(0.069)	(0.054)
Post $\times$ neg. DI sh.							0.253***
							(0.067)
Mean Dependent Variable	0.71	0.71	0.71	0.71	0.71	0.71	0.71
District FE	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
YQ FE	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Reg-YQ FE						X	X
Observations	6,156	6,156	6,156	6,156	6,156	6,156	6,156

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Notes: Table reports estimates from linear regressions on quarterly, district-level data from 2001-2019 following equation (7). Columns 2-5 add the post-BAPCPA indicator interacted with state homestead exemptions (column 2), an indicator means test for the states Cornwell and Xu (2014) argues are more affected by the means test (column 3), the districts' changes attorney fees from Lupica (2012) and the pre-BAPCPA (2003-2004) share in Chapter 7 similar to Chakrabarti and Pattison (2019) (column 4), and all controls together (column 5). Column 6 add region-by-year fixed effects, and column 7 adds a control for the share of debtors with negative disposable income in each district. Bootstrap standard errors are from 500 bootstrap samples in a procedure that accounts for both clustered observations at the district level and the estimated regressor ΔG_d^O. Details are in Online Appendix D.

Figure 1: Disposable Income and Chapter Choice

(a) Ch.7 Eligibility

(b) Chapter Choice

Sample consists of cases filed in FY2009-2019 within the 83 districts included in the main analysis. Debtors are grouped into $50 bins based on their disposable income. Panel (a) shows the share of Chapter 7 cases that were dismissed or converted in each bin. The shaded region shows the 10th percentile and 90th percentile of the cross-district distributions. Panel (b) shows the share of cases in Chapter 7, along with the 10th and 90th percentiles of the cross-district distributions in the shaded region.

Figure 2: Heterogeneity in Screening the Average Debtor

(a) Eligibility across Districts   (b) Chapter Choice across Districts

These figures show, for the average filer, the heterogeneity in screening across districts and its impact on chapter choice. To generate the figures, we use the mean characteristics debtors in the national sample, $\bar{X}$. Figure (a) the histogram of predicted eligibility ratios for each district. Figure (b) shows the predicted chapter choice as a function of the predicted eligibility for each district.

(a) Mean Prob. of Ch.7 Dismissal

(b) Mean Prob. of Ch. 13 Dismissal

These maps report the average case dismissal probability for each district. The Chapter 7 probability for a district d is equals one minus the average predicted Chapter 7 eligibility when using district d's eligibility model, with the average taken over all filers in the national sample. Chapter 13 probabilities are computed similarly.

Figure 4: Geographic Variation in Chapter 7 Share

(a) Bivariate

(b) Multivariate

This figure reports two sets of standardized coefficient estimates with Chapter 7 share as the dependent variable. Panel (a) shows bivariate OLS estimates for each explanatory variable, where both the dependent variable and each regressor are standardized to mean zero and standard deviation one. Panel (b) shows coefficients from a multivariate OLS regression including all variables. Horizontal bars display 95% confidence intervals using heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors.

Figure 5: Impact of BAPCPA's Means Test

(a) Eligibility   (b) Chapter Choice

Notes: These figures report the model-generated predictions for the district-specific impact of BAPCPA's means test on eligibility and chapter choice. Figure (a) shows the effect of the means test on each district's average eligibility for Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 among positive-disposable-income debtors. Each point represents a district, and the horizontal bars show the means of the distributions. Figure (b) shows a histogram of the change in each district's overall share of bankruptcies under Chapter 7 (ΔP_d^O) as a result of adding the means test, with the vertical red line showing the mean change.

Figure 6: Means Test Impact by Pre-Existing Screening Stringency

(a) Chapter 7 Ineligibility

(b) Chapter 7 Filing Rates

These figures show each district's average Chapter 7 ineligibility probability without the means test (horizontal axis) and the change in the ineligibility probability once the means test is implemented (panel a, vertical axis) and the predicted change in the filing rate once the means test is implemented (panel b, vertical axis).

Figure 7: Event Study of Mean Test Impact

Notes: This figure reports coefficients from an event study regression on quarterly, district-level data from 2001–2019. Each coefficient shows the relationship between the model's predicted impact of the means test (ΔP_d^O) and actual changes in the Chapter 7 share for a given quarter. Controls match Table 5 column (1). The vertical line marks BAPCPA's enactment in October 2005. Error bars show 95% bias-corrected bootstrap percentile intervals (Efron, 1982), using 500 bootstrap samples that account for district-level clustering and the estimated regressor ΔP_d^O. See Online Appendix Appendix D for details.

Appendix A   Appendix Tables and Figures

Table A1: Case Outcomes

Case Outcome	Disposable Income		
	< $0	[$0, $100)	≥ $100
Initial Chapter 13			
Converted (Early) to Other Chapter (%)	53.21	68.85	22.77
Dismissed (%)	46.78	31.15	77.23
Failure to File Information (%)	17.16	9.31	13.26
Failure to Pay Filing Fee (%)	3.20	2.76	9.70
Abuse (%)	0.40	0.25	0.38
Other Reason (not specified) (%)	26.02	18.83	53.89
N	8,256	5,178	30,754
Initial Chapter 7			
Converted (Early) to Other Chapter (%)	14.77	20.01	54.23
Dismissed (%)	85.23	79.99	45.77
Failure to File Information (%)	14.84	10.30	9.47
Failure to Pay Filing Fee (%)	15.59	16.96	7.95
Abuse (%)	3.15	3.01	2.83
Other Reason (not specified) (%)	51.64	49.72	25.52
N	30,670	15,487	14,850

Sample: Cases filed FY2011-2015, excluding Alabama and North Carolina (the districts outside of the United States Trustee program. This table shows, for cases that were dismissed or converted shortly after filing, the distribution across conversions and reasons for dismissal. In Chapter 7, where the median case takes less than four months to receive a discharge, any dismissal or conversion is included. In Chapter 13, more than half of cases are dismissed or converted at some point during the three-to-five-year plan, mostly due to the debtor missing plan payments. To focus on dismissals and conversions related to ineligibility for Chapter 13, we only include early dismissals or conversions that occur within four months of filing. `dism_early` and `converted_early` show these rates of dismissals and conversions.

Table A2: Variable Definitions (1)

Variable	Definition
elig	Eligible to file under chosen chapter. Defined as not dismissed or converted in the months after filing. For chapter 7 filings, which only take a few months to complete, all dismissals and conversions are counted as indicators of ineligibility. For Chapter 13, we only count dismissals and conversions within the first four months of a case as indicators of ineligibility. We exclude later dismissals within Chapter 13 because the dismissals are primarily due to the debtor's failure to make plan payments, not because the debtor is deemed ineligible.
disp_income	Estimated disposable income at the time of filing, calculated as the difference between Schedule I Average Monthly Income and Schedule J Average Monthly Expenses. Average Monthly Expenses is adjusted for differential reporting in Conduit and Direct-Pay districts, as discussed in Online Appendix B.
pct_repay5	Amount of nonpriority unsecured debt that could be repaid out of disposable income over a five-year Chapter 13 repayment plan, calculated as $(60 \times \texttt{disp\_income} - \texttt{priority\_unsecured})/\texttt{nonpriority\_unsecured}$ and truncated between 0% and 100%.
incdropbig	Indicator for whether (average) monthly income at the time of filing (`avgmnthi`) is at least \$500 below average monthly income in prior six months (`cntmnthi`), i.e., $\texttt{avgmnthi} - \texttt{cntmnthi} < -\$500$
expense_gap	Actual monthly expenses minus IRS location-adjusted standard expenses. actual expenses are from Schedule J, adjusted for conduit and direct-pay districts. IRS local standards are defined below in the variable `irs_expense`
prose	Indicator for whether the first listed debtor in the bankruptcy petition was pro se (not represented by an attorney)
joint_file	Indicator for whether the bankruptcy petition is a joint petition (by spouses)
AMI	Indicator for whether `cntmnthi` exceeds the median income of the state as defined in the means test forms at the time of filing. The two-person income threshold is used for joint filings, and the single-person threshold for joint filings. Data available here: Income standards for means testing
amt_above_means	Amount by which average annual income ($12 \times \texttt{cntmnthi}$) exceeds the applicable means test threshold, as defined in `AMI`.

Table A3: Variable Definitions (2)

Variable	Definition
avgmnthi	Estimated monthly household income of debtor at the time of filing, reported as Average Monthly Income from Schedule I
cntmnthi	The monthly income of the household from all sources, averaged over the six months prior to filing; Current Monthly Income from form 22A for Chapter 7 debtors or form 22C for Chapter 13 debtors.
debt_to_income	Total liabilities (unsecured plus secured) over annual income. Annual income is defined as $12 \times$ `avgmnthi`
assets_to_income	Total assets over annual income ($12 \times$ `avgmnthi`)
unsec	Sum of nonprioirity and priority unsecured debt
sh_secured	Secured debt divided by total liabilities
sh_nodischarge	Nondischargeable debt divided by total liabilities; nondischargeable debt consists of domestic support obligations, taxes and certain debts owed to the government, student loan obligations, some other legal debts, and obligations to pension or profit-sharing programs.
homeowner	Indicator for whether the debtor owns real property
sh_real	Real property value divided by total assets
pos_equity	Positive home equity, defined as $\max\{equity, 0\}$, where equity is defined as real property value minus total reported secured debt; See Pattison and Hynes (2020) for evidence that this accurately measures home equity.
neg_equity	Negative home equity, defined as max{-equity, 0}
nonexempt_equity	$\max\{equity - exemption, 0\}$, where exemption is the maximum of the state and, if applicable, federal homestead exemption at the time of filing. Married homestead exemptions are used for joint filings, and single homestead exemptions for single filings. Exemption data are from (Pattison and Hynes, 2020), which also validates this measure of nonexempt equity.
pct_black	Share of residence in debtor's home zip code that are Black, from 2018 five-year ACS estimates
irs_expense	Sum of the IRS local and national standards for housing expenses (mortgage and non-mortgage), transportation expenses (operation and ownership), household expenses (food, housekeeping, apparel and service, personal care, miscellaneous), and out-of-pocket expenditures. We use two-person standards for joint-filings and one-person standards for single filings. The IRS standards depend on the debtor's location of residence (MSA or state) and the filing date. Data available here: IRS standards for means testing

Figure A1: Dismissals/Conversions and Disposable Income by Chapter


(a) Chapter 7 Cases

(b) Chapter 13 Cases

Sample consists of cases filed in FY2009-2019 within the 83 districts included in the main analysis. Debtors are grouped into $50 bins based on their disposable income. Panel (a) shows the share of Chapter 7 cases that were dismissed or converted in each bin. Panel (b) shows the share of Chapter 13 cases that were dismissed or converted in each bin.

Figure A2: Disposable Income and Chapter Choice
(Below-Median-Income Debtors)

(a) Ch.7 Dismissals and Conversions   (b) Chapter Choice

Sample consists of cases filed by below-median-income debtors in FY2009-2015 within the 83 districts included in the main analysis. . Debtors are grouped into $50 bins based on their disposable income. Panel (a) shows the share of Chapter 7 cases that were dismissed or converted in each bin. The shaded region shows the 10th percentile and 90th percentile of the cross-district distributions. Panel (b) shows the share of cases in Chapter 7, along with the 10th and 90th percentiles of the cross-district distributions in the shaded region.

Figure A3: Cross-District Variation by Disposable Income

The figures above show the distribution of districts' Chapter 7 bankruptcy share for debtors with positive disposable income (left histogram) and with non-positive disposable income (right histogram). The blue line marks the mean across districts.

Appendix B   Adjusting Disposable Income for Conduit Districts

We adjust a key variable, disposable income, to account for differences in how mortgage payments are reported in some districts. Specifically, in a subset of districts that use conduit Chapter 13 plans (defined below), mortgage payments are not reported as expenses on Schedule J. Because disposable income equals reported income less expenses, this makes disposable income artificially high for Chapter 13 debtors with mortgage payments in these districts. To correct this, we approximate mortgage payments and subtract the amount from reported disposable income. The remainder of this section provides more detail on this procedure.

Some districts use conduit plans, in which mortgage payments are made through the Chapter 13 plan, or direct payment plans, in which debtors with a mortgage pay the mortgagor directly.[52] For our purposes, this matters because (i) conduit districts typically exclude mortgage payments

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[52]In many conduit districts, this is implemented through the local Chapter 13 plans or the practices of the local trustee. In some places, only a subset of Chapter 13 cases will be conduit plans (e.g. unless the court allows direct payment, or depending on whether a prepetition arrearage exists) (American Bankruptcy Institute, 2019).

Figure A4: Impact of the Means Test on Chapter 13 Ineligibility

Figure shows each district's average Chapter 13 ineligibility probability without the means test (horizontal axis) and the change in the ineligibility probability once the means test is implemented (vertical axis).

Figure A5: Cross-District Dispersion in Chapter 7 Shares

(a) Standard Deviation

(b) Coefficient of Variation

Notes: Panels plot quarterly cross-district dispersion in Chapter 7 shares computed from district-level data, 2001–2019. The vertical line marks BAPCPA's implementation in 2005Q4. Chapter 7 shares are defined as consumer Chapter 7 filings divided by total consumer filings.

from Chapter 13 filers' Schedule J expenses, and (ii) these reported Schedule J expenses enter our calculation of disposable income. We adjust for this different treatment of Chapter 13 filers with mortgages in conduit districts.

We first classify conduit districts and direct payment districts using the Chapter 13 Trustee Final Reports from 2008-2019. If ongoing mortgage payments account for at least 10% of total Chapter 13 disbursements, we classify that district as a conduit district. Districts in which ongoing mortgage payments make up less than 10% of total Chapter 13 disbursements are classified as direct payment districts.[53] Among conduit districts, ongoing mortgage payments average 29.2% of Chapter 13 total disbursements in the average district. Among direct-payment districts, ongoing mortgage payments average 1.8% of Chapter 13 total disbursements in the average district.

Conduit districts typically exclude mortgage payments from Schedule J expenses for Chapter 13 mortgage holders and, as a result, the bankruptcy forms overstate these debtors' disposable income. Only mortgage holders in Chapter 13 are affected by conduit reporting in these districts. To illustrate, Figure B1 compares the disposable income share, i.e. the share of income that is disposable, across those with and without mortgages in direct-payment and conduit districts.[54] The distributions of disposable income shares are similar across direct-payment and conduit districts, except for Chapter 13 filers with a mortgage. But, in conduit districts, Chapter 13 filers with a mortgage report higher disposable income (bottom-right figure). This difference in the empirical CDFs reflects that conduit districts exclude mortgage payments from Schedule J expenses.

To adjust for the different treatment of mortgage payments among Chapter 13 debtors in conduit districts, we estimate their monthly housing payment and add the amount to their monthly expenses. We compute each filer's expected monthly mortgage payment, assuming that the principal at origination equaled the reported real property value less a 6% down payment, and that the filer took out a 30-year mortgage with an annual interest rate of 7%.[55] We then adjust Schedule J expenses by adding these expected mortgage payments to all Chapter 13 filers in conduit districts

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[53]Alabama and North Carolina are not present in the Trustee Final Reports. We classify Alabama as a direct payment district and North Carolina as a conduit district, based on the similarity of Schedule J expenses to the districts we classify using the Final Reports.

[54]Disposable income is defined as the difference between Schedule I average monthly income and Schedule J average monthly expenses.

[55]The 6% down payment is the average down payment (see `https://www.rocketmortgage.com/learn/what-is-the-average-down-payment-on-a-house`). The 7% interest rate equals the presumptive interest rate applied to installment debt in many Chapter 13 districts at that time (see `https://www.mssb.uscourts.gov/rulesorders-procedures/presumptive-interest-rate/`.)

with a disposable income share of at least 30%. Figure B2 plots the empirical CDFs of the disposable income shares after making this adjustment. After adjustment, the distributions of disposable income are much more similar across conduit and non-conduit districts.

Figure B1: Before Adjustment: Disposable Income of Direct-Payment and Conduit Districts

The figure plots the empirical cumulative distribution functions of the share of income that is disposable. Shares below -1 are assigned a value of -1. The sample excludes filers with less than \$500 in reported monthly income.

Figure B2: After Adjustment: Disposable Income of Direct-Payment and Conduit Districts

The figure plots the empirical cumulative distribution functions of the share of income that is disposable, adjusted for housing expenditures for Chapter 13 filers with mortgages in conduit districts. Shares below −1 are assigned a value of −1. The sample excludes filers with less than $500 in reported monthly income.

Appendix C   Measuring Above-Median Income

In this section, we discuss and investigate the sensitivity of our results to different measures of above-median-income status. Above-median status is particularly important for our analysis, because it is the variable that allows us to identify the effect of BAPCPA's means test, which applies only to above-median income debtors.

Legally, the means test applies if a debtor is above their state's median income *adjusted for household size*. We do not observe the household size, and instead, our primary measure assumes that each household has zero non-filing members and so treats all single filers as single-person households and all joint filers as two-person households. This applies the lowest possible median income threshold for each household. As a result, it creates one-sided measurement error because we will apply too low of a median-income threshold to the households with non-filing household members, and so may mistakenly count them as above-median-income when they are not.

Appendix C.1   Support for Primary Measure of Above-Median Status

First, we provide evidence about the accuracy of our primary measure of disposable income. If a debtor's income exceeds the median, the debtor faces additional restrictions in both Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 that may discourage filings in both chapters. Consistent with the accuracy of our measure, we find a sharp, discontinuous decline in both Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 filings exactly once debtors' incomes exceed our measure of the applicable median income (Appendix Figure C1). Using our main measure and counting both Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 filings, there are 8,018 cases with reported gap in the range of $[-\$199, \$0]$, but only 6,361 cases with reported incomes in the range $[\$1, \$200]$, a discontinuity of 1,657 cases.

The primary measure assumes filers have zero non-filing household members and so applies the median income threshold for one-person household for single filers and two-person households for joint filers. We refer to this as Threshold 1. For comparison, we also show the discontinuities if we assume each filer has one non-filing household member (Threshold 2) or two non-filing household members (Threshold 3). If we use Threshold 2, the discontinuity is 656 cases and if we use Threshold 3, the discontinuity is 689 cases. These discontinuities are smaller than those using Threshold 1, suggesting that our main measure captures the relevant means test threshold for most households.

As a separate test, we collect an alternative measure of debtors' above-median-income status by searching each case's court dockets for the presence of specific bankruptcy forms that are only filed by above-median debtors. Specifically, there are certain bankruptcy forms (forms 122A-2 in Chapter 7 and 122-C2 in Chapter 13) that debtors only need to complete if they report above-median income. A few districts report whether the filer has submitted these forms on their bankruptcy court dockets. In many courts, this docket information from 2013 to the present has been scraped and made publicly available.[56] We are able to identify 20 districts that consistently report the presence of these forms for above-median income debtors between 2015 and 2019.[57] In these districts, 41.2% of cases we identify as above-median income have dockets with these forms, while 3.05% of cases we identify as below-median income do.[58] Thus, this independent measure corroborates our main measure of above-median-income status.

The model estimates of Section 5 also indicate that our measure accurately captures the means test. The means test restricts eligibility for Chapter 7 but not Chapter 13. Consistent with this, the AME estimates of the means test reported in Table 2 show a strong effect of the means test in Chapter 7, but virtually no effect in Chapter 13. Similarly, in the counterfactual policy analysis, our structural model is able to accurately predict changes in chapter choice that came with the introduction of the means test (Figure 5).

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[56]Journalist Matt Clark made these data available here link

[57]To do so, we search the text of each docket entry for the strings "22A-2" or "22C-2". In some courts, dockets contain these entries regardless of whether the debtor actually fills out these forms. To identify districts where these forms provide a good measure of above-median status, we (i) require that over 98% of the cases on our FJC sample are matched to dockets, (ii) at least 5% of the cases marked as above-median income in the FJC data have dockets entries listing the forms, and (iii) cases marked above-median income in the FJC have at least 4 times as many reported forms as cases marked below-median income in the FJC.

[58]These "false positives" may come from measurement error in this alternative measure or from mistakes or updates to income as reported in the FJC database.

Figure C1: Discontinuity around Means Test Income Threshold

Number of filings in main sample, grouped into $200-wide bins based on the difference between the reported current monthly income (CMI) and the applicable means test income threshold. For single filers, we apply the single-person household median income for the state at the time of filing, and for joint filers we apply the two-person household threshold.

Appendix C.2 Robustness to Alternative Measures of Above-Median Status

We also examine the sensitivity of our estimates to using alternative measures of above-median status. Our primary measure assigns median income as if all debtors have zero non-filing household members. We examine three alternative measures, detailed in Table C1, which use alternative thresholds when determining the means test (Measures 1 and 2) or use the independent measure based on the docket reports as described above.

Under each measure of above-median-income status, we reestimate the district-specific eligibility models of equation (1). We then compare the estimated effect of the means test as measured by the means test's average marginal effect (AME). We report the correlation coefficient between the primary and alternative district-specific AMEs in Table C1, and show the estimates graphically in Figure C2. When using alternative thresholds, the average marginal effects of the means test on dismissal rates remain similar to those of the primary (Baseline) measure. In Chapter 7, the district-specific AMEs are highly correlated across the measures. The correlation coefficient between the baseline estimate and the alternative measures is 0.92 when assuming one non-filing household member, and 0.81 when assuming two non-filing household members. In Chapter 13, the AMEs remain tightly clustered around zero.

We also compare estimates when using the third alternative measure based on the presence of specific bankruptcy forms in the dockets, and find similar patterns. This alternative forms measure of above-median status is only available for a subset of districts for the years 2015-2019. For our comparison, we reestimate the main model on the years 2015-2019. Again, the correlation is high at 0.85. To summarize, we estimate similar district-specific effects of the means test regardless of exactly how we measure above-median-income status.

Table C1: Alternative Measures of Above-Median Status

Measure (1)	Definition (2)	Correlation with Baseline AME (Ch.7) (3)
Baseline	Median Income Threshold 1. `AMI` as defined in A2. Compares current monthly income as reported in the FJC data at the time of filing to the state median income adjusted for household size. Assumes **zero** non-filing household members when assigning the applicable state median income.	1
Measure 1	Median Income Threshold 2. Compares current monthly income as reported in the FJC data at the time of filing to the state median income adjusted for household size. Assumes **one** non-filing household member when assigning the applicable state median income.	0.92
Measure 2	Median Income Threshold 3. Compares current monthly income as reported in the FJC data at the time of filing to the state median income adjusted for household size. Assumes **two** non-filing household members when assigning the applicable state median income.	0.81
Measure 3	Forms indicator. Examines case dockets, and identifies above-median debtors based on whether the case has filed either from 122A-2 or 122C-2, which are only filed by above-median-income debtors. This measure is only available for a subset of districts and during the period 2015-2019. For comparison with the baseline estimates, we re-estimate the baseline model on these districts using the same 2015-2019 sample of cases. Column (3) compares the average marginal effect from this reestimated baseline model to the model estimated using Measure 3.	0.85

Table reports the Baseline and three alternative measures of above-median-income status used for the robustness checks. Column (3) reports the correlation of the district-specific average marginal effects (AMEs) from the Chapter 7 models using the alternative measures. We do not report the correlation for the Chapter 13 models because nearly all AMEs are clustered near zero, but the AMEs are shown in the second column of Figure C2.

Figure C2: Alternative Measures of Above-Median Income

(a) Ch.7, Measure 1

(b) Ch.13, Measure 1

(c) Ch.7, Measure 2

(d) Ch.13, Measure 2

(e) Ch.7, Measure 3

(f) Ch.13, Measure 3

Figure plots the estimated district-specific AMEs of the means test when using alternative measures of above-median status (vertical axis), plotted against the AMEs from the baseline measure (horizontal axis).

Appendix D   Bootstrap Procedure

We first detail the main bootstrap procedure used to obtain standard errors, p-values, and confidence intervals for the chapter choice model and the decomposition estimates. We then discuss a second bootstrap procedure used to account for clustering in the difference-in-difference model of equation (7).

Main Bootstrap Procedure   We form our main bootstrap samples and estimates using the following procedure:

1. Let N_d denote the number of observations from district d in the original sample. For each district d, we randomly draw a bootstrap sample, with replacement, of N_d observations from the original sample.

2. Using the bootstrap sample, we then estimate

   - **Eligibility Models** Using the bootstrap sample, we estimate the district-chapter-specific eligibility models following the specification in equation (1). In some bootstrap samples, a small number of district-specific models do not converge. In these cases, we drop those districts from the remaining chapter choice and means test analysis.

   - **Chapter Choice Models** Using the predicted eligibility from the bootstrap-sample models estimated in the prior step, we use the same bootstrap sample to estimate the chapter choice model in equation (5).

   - **Counterfactual: Means Test** Using the bootstrap sample and bootstrap-estimated eligibility and chapter choice models, we generate the predicted change in each district's chapter choice caused by the removal of the means test, ΔP_d^b, as discussed in Section 7.1 and where b denotes that this predicted change is generated using bootstrap sample b. We then form $\Delta P_d^{O,b} = DI_d \Delta P_d^b$ to form the predicted change in the chapter choice of district d. The share of positive income debtors, DI_d, is the same across all bootstrap samples because the bootstrap procedure resamples from our main estimation sample, which includes only debtors with positive disposable income.

To summarize, for the bootstrap sample b, we obtain estimates of (i) the parameters in each district-chapter-specific eligibility model, (ii) the parameters of the chapter choice model, and (iii) the counterfactual change in each district's share under Chapter 13 caused by removing the means test.

3. We repeat this procedure for $b = 1, \ldots, 500$.

Bootstrap standard errors and p-values Let $B = 500$ be the number of bootstrap samples, $\hat{\theta}$ be a parameter estimated in the main sample, and $\hat{\theta}^*(b)$ be the same parameter estimated using bootstrap sample b. Following Hansen (2022), we estimate the bootstrap variance as

$$\hat{V}_{\hat{\theta}}^{\text{boot}} = \frac{1}{B-1} \sum_{b=1}^{B} \left(\hat{\theta}^*(b) - \bar{\theta}^* \right) \left(\hat{\theta}^*(b) - \bar{\theta}^* \right)'$$

$$\bar{\theta}^* = \frac{1}{B} \sum_{b=1}^{B} \hat{\theta}^*(b).$$

For the estimator $\hat{\theta}$, the *bootstrap standard error* is the square root of the bootstrap estimator of variance:

$$s_{\hat{\theta}}^{\text{boot}} = \sqrt{\hat{V}_{\hat{\theta}}^{\text{boot}}}.$$

We report bootstrap p-values for the null hypothesis that the parameter $\theta_0 = 0$ as

$$p^* = \frac{1}{B} \sum_{b=1}^{B} \mathbb{1}\left\{ |\hat{\theta}^*(b) - \hat{\theta}| > |\hat{\theta} - \theta_0| \right\}.$$

We also report bias-corrected (BC) percentile intervals of Efron (1982) as described in Hansen (2022).

Bootstrapping for Clustered Observations in BAPCPA Regression For the district-quarter level regressions in equation (7) and reported in Table 5, we adjust the bootstrap procedure to account for both the estimated regressor ΔP_d^O and the clustering of observations at the district level. Specifically, we combine a pairs cluster bootstrap for the district-quarter level observations and the earlier bootstrap procedure for ΔP_d^O outlined above.

- **Pairs Cluster Bootstrap** The original sample used to estimate equation (7) contains observations from 81 districts and each quarter from 2001-2019. To form bootstrap sample b, we randomly draw, with replacement, 81 districts. Because we draw with replacement, some districts will appear in the sample multiple times. For each district in the bootstrap sample, we include all quarterly observations from 2001-2019.

- **Bootstrap Estimated Regressor** To account for the uncertainty in the estimated regressor, ΔP_d^O, we merge each district with its bootstrap-estimated parameter $\Delta P_d^{O,b}$. As discussed above, the variation in this parameter across bootstrap samples reflects the variation in both the eligibility models, the chapter choice models, and the distribution of variables in the sample.

- The bootstrap sample b combines the pairs cluster bootstrap with the earlier bootstrap procedure generating $\Delta P_d^{O,b}$. We use this sample to estimate equation (7) and form bootstrap estimates of the coefficient of interest β_1^b and the other model parameters.

- Bootstrap standard errors and p-values are calculated as described above.

We use this same procedure to calculate standard errors for the event study estimates reported in Figure 7.

Appendix E   Geographic Variation in Chapter Choice and Dismissal Rates

Appendix E.1   Variables and Summary Statistics

Table E1: Variable List

Variable	Group	Geo. Level	Definition	Source
Ch. 7 attorney fee	Legal	State	Post-BAPCPA average Ch. 7 attorney fee	[1]
Ch. 13 attorney fee	Legal	State	Post-BAPCA average Ch. 13 attorney fee, including pre- and post-petition fees	[1]
Homestead exemption	Legal	State	2011 state homestead exemption (max of state and federal if federal available). Unlimited exemptions are coded as the maximum of all other states' exemptions.	[2]
Wildcard exemption	Legal	State	2011 state wildcard exemption (max of state and federal if federal available)	[2]
Garnishment protection	Legal	State	Weekly wages protected from garnishment for a minimum-wage full-time worker who heads a 4-person household	[3]
Hispanic	Demo.	District	Share of total population identifying as Hispanic	[4]
Black	Demo.	District	Share of total population identifying as Black	[4]
Divorced	Demo.	District	Share of population age 15+ that is divorced	[4]
Avg. # of children	Demo.	State	Average number of children in a household	[5]
College degree	Economic	District	Share of population age 18+ with at least a BA degree	[4]
Unemployment rate	Economic	District	Average unemployment rate (2010–2015)	[6]
Employed	Economic	District	Share of working-age population (25–64) that is employed	[4]
Health insurance	Economic	District	Share of individuals age 18+ with health insurance	[4]
Median household income	Economic	State	Median household income	[5]
Homeowner	Economic	District	Share of households that are owner-occupied	[4]
Has vehicle	Economic	District	Share of households with at least one vehicle	[4]
Income inequality (Gini)	Economic	State	State Gini coefficient on household income	[5]
Democrat vote share	Ideology	State	Democrat vote share in the 2012 presidential election	[7]
Believes gov't aid helps the poor	Ideology	State	Share agreeing that "government aid to the poor does more good than harm"	[8]
Catholic	Ideology	State	Share Catholic	[8]
Evangelical	Ideology	State	Share in Evangelical Protestant Tradition	[8]
Mainline protestant	Ideology	State	Share in Mainline Protestant Tradition	[8]
Other religion	Ideology	State	Share in other religion (excluding None and DK/Refused)	[8]

This table lists the heterogeneity variables used in the analysis of geographic variation in Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 dismissal rates and Chapter 13 filing shares. The columns report the variable name, group (Legal, Economic, Demographic, Ideology), geographic level (State or District), definition, and data source.

Sources: [1] Lupica, Lois (2013). *The Consumer Bankruptcy Creditor Distribution Study.* SSRN 2480170.
[2] Indarte, Sasha (2021). *Moral Hazard Versus Liquidity in Household Bankruptcy.* Working paper.
[3] National Consumer Law Center (2019). *Still No Fresh Start: How States Allow Debt Collectors to Push Families into Poverty.*   [4] NHGIS ACS 2011–2015.   [5] IPUMS USA (Ruggles et al.), Version 16.0.
[6] Bureau of Labor Statistics, Local Area Unemployment Statistics.   [7] MIT Election Data and Science Lab (2017). *U.S. President 1976–2020.* Harvard Dataverse.   [8] Pew Research Center (2014). *Religious Landscape Study.*

Table E2: Variable Summary Statistics

Variable	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Ch.13 Share (%)	29.0	17.0	6.0	78.4
Ch.7 Share (%)	71.0	17.0	21.6	94.0
Pr. Dismissal Ch. 7	5.9	2.9	1.5	15.7
Pr. Dismissal Ch. 13	5.6	3.2	1.2	19.6
Ch. 7 attorney fee ($)	801.2	207.8	449.0	1251.0
Ch. 13 attorney fee ($)	2545.2	640.3	1360.0	6410.0
Homestead exemption ($)	153623.0	210368.8	5000.0	550000.0
Wildcard exemption ($)	1558.7	2667.4	0.0	11000.0
Garnishment protection ($)	364.4	182.3	217.5	750.0
Hispanic (%)	16.5	16.8	1.2	66.4
Black (%)	15.0	13.9	0.6	53.3
Divorced (%)	11.5	1.5	7.4	14.3
Avg. # of children	0.7	0.1	0.5	1.0
Homeowner (%)	65.6	5.6	39.1	73.9
College degree (%)	25.1	5.7	10.0	39.5
Has vehicle (%)	91.9	5.4	52.7	96.3
Health insurance (%)	85.5	4.6	72.8	95.9
Unemployment rate (%)	6.9	1.5	3.0	11.8
Employed (%)	71.6	4.8	54.8	81.7
Median household income ($)	52814.2	7963.4	39016.0	73800.0
Income inequality (Gini)	0.5	0.0	0.4	0.5
Democrat vote share (Pres. 2012, %)	48.1	9.5	24.7	70.1
Believes gov't aid helps the poor (%)	49.4	5.3	32.5	62.0
Catholic (%)	19.0	8.6	4.2	42.2
Evangelical (%)	27.3	11.1	6.6	52.1
Mainline Protestant (%)	15.8	5.6	5.6	32.0
Other religion (%)	14.8	7.7	2.7	59.7

This table reports summary statistics for the heterogeneity variables used in the analysis of geographic variation in Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 dismissal rates and Chapter 13 filing shares. The columns report the variable name, mean, standard deviation, minimum, and maximum.

Appendix E.2   Correlates of Dismissal Rates

This section examines which district and state characteristics are correlated with the geographic variation in Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 dismissal rates. To do so, we examine the relationship between district-level Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 dismissal rates and the set of legal, economic, demographic, and ideological variables from the literature.

First, Figure E1 reports the bivariate (panels a and b) and multivariate (panels c and d) correlations between each explanatory variable and the dismissal rates. Both the dependent and independent variables are standardized, so the magnitudes are comparable across variables. No clear patterns emerge. In the bivariate analysis, there is a strong positive correlation between Chapter 7 dismissal rates and the share of Black residents. This suggests that heterogeneity in dismissal rates may help explain the well-documented racial differences in chapter choice. There are weak negative correlations with several economic indicators, including employment, income, and insurance coverage. Lastly, there is heterogeneity but no clear pattern across the ideological variables. Chapter 13 dismissal rates exhibit a different structure. They are positively associated with Hispanic population shares and with the number of children, and negatively associated with health insurance coverage and Mainline Protestant affiliation. Legal variables show little systematic relationship with Chapter 13 dismissal risk. In the multivariate analysis, few variables retain statistically significant associations with dismissal rates once all other variables are included.

Table E3 reports the LMG decomposition for both dismissal rates. Focusing on the full model (column 5), no single category dominates: for Chapter 7, demographic and ideological variables each explain roughly 0.16–0.17 in single-group models, with legal and economic variables contributing more modestly. For Chapter 13, economic and demographic variables explain comparable portions. In the full model, all groups contribute, with no dominant predictor. Moreover, in both chapters, the total R^2 is 0.36–0.37, indicating that most of the variation in dismissal rates is unexplained by these other variables. This diffuse pattern reinforces treating dismissal rates as distinct institutional measures rather than derivatives of standard covariates.

Figure E1: Correlates of Dismissal Rates

(a) Bivariate

(b) Bivariate

(c) Multivariate

(d) Multivariate

Panel (a) shows bivariate OLS estimates between district-level Chapter 7 dismissal rates and each explanatory variable, where both the dependent variable and each regressor are standardized to mean zero and standard deviation one. Panel (b) shows bivariate OLS estimates between Chapter 13 dismissal rates and each explanatory variable. Panels (c) and (d) repeat these analyses using multivariate OLS models with all explanatory variables. Horizontal bars display 95% confidence intervals using heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors.

Table E3: Decomposing Dismissal Rates

Group	Legal (1)	Economic (2)	Demographic (3)	Ideology (4)	Full model (5)
A: Decomposing Ch. 7 Dismissal Rates					
Legal	0.117	–	–	–	0.078
Demographic	–	–	0.155	–	0.113
Economic	–	0.084	–	–	0.078
Ideology	–	–	–	0.169	0.101
Total R-squared	0.117	0.084	0.155	0.169	0.371
B: Decomposing Ch. 13 Dismissal Rates					
Legal	0.06	–	–	–	0.105
Demographic	–	–	0.111	–	0.086
Economic	–	0.124	–	–	0.090
Ideology	–	–	–	0.085	0.077
Total R-squared	0.06	0.124	0.111	0.085	0.358

This table reports the Shapley (LMG) decomposition of the model's R^2 for Chapter 7 Dismissal Rates (Panel A) and Chapter 13 Dismissal Rates (Panel B). Screening variables (the Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 dismissal probabilities) are included in all specifications. Additional groups (Legal, Economic, Demographic, Ideology) are added one at a time, with the final column reporting the full model containing all groups. Entries are absolute contributions to R^2, and the final row reports the total R^2 for each specification. Each value represents the contribution of the corresponding group of variables to the model's explained variation in the dependent variable, computed by averaging marginal improvements in R^2 across all possible group orderings. All variables are standardized prior to estimation. The final row reports the full model's R^2.